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Abstract 
Globally, 74 countries have domestic investment laws that mention investor-state arbitration and 42 of these 
laws provide consent to it. That is, they give foreign investors the right to bypass national courts and bring 
claims directly to arbitration. What explains this variation, and why do any governments include investor-state 
arbitration in domestic legislation? We argue that governments incorporate arbitration into their domestic laws 
because doing so was labelled ‘international best practice’ by specialist units at the World Bank. We introduce 
the concept of asymmetric diffusion, which occurs when a policy is framed as international best practice but 
only recommended to a subset of states. No developed state consents to arbitration in their domestic law, nor 
does the World Bank recommend that they do so. Yet we show that governments who receive technical 
assistance from the World Bank’s Foreign Investment Advisory Service are more likely to include arbitration 
in their laws. We first use event history analysis and find that receiving World Bank technical assistance is an 
exceptionally strong predictor of domestic investment laws with arbitration. Then we illustrate our argument 
with a case study of the Kyrgyz Republic’s 2003 law.  
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In 2009, a tribunal of arbitrators in the World Bank’s Paris office debated a few words of 
Venezuelan law at length, before deciding it did not give them jurisdiction to decide a claim 
brought by Mobil Corporation against Venezuela.1 If the Venezuelan law had been clearer, the 
Mobil award and several others against Venezuela might have been larger, likely billions of 
dollars larger.2 For governments deciding whether or not to include investor-state arbitration in 
their domestic investment laws, the stakes are high.  
To date, 61 known investor-state arbitration cases have relied on domestic laws 
(Hepburn, 2018, p. 659) and there is potential for many more. At least 74 countries have 
domestic investment laws that mention investor-state arbitration (or have mentioned it), and 42 
of these laws provide consent to this form of arbitration (or provided consent, before being 
rewritten). What explains this variation in domestic investment laws?  
Governments’ decisions to mention arbitration in their domestic laws are puzzling for 
several reasons. First, arbitration clauses can be extremely costly. If cases are brought and the 
investor wins, arbitrators can compel the government to pay large monetary awards. Legal costs 
for states are often substantial, averaging US$5 million per case, regardless of the outcome (Pelc, 
2017, p. 566). Second, the benefits are uncertain. While governments may hope for additional 
investment, available evidence shows that giving investors access to investment arbitration does 
 
1 Mobil and others v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, Decision on Jurisdiction (2010, pp. 19–33). 
2 ConocoPhillips and ExxonMobil routed their investment in Venezuela through Dutch subsidiaries and also brought 
claims under the Netherlands-Venezuela bilateral investment treaty. The arbitral tribunal found they had 
jurisdiction for all aspects of the disputes after the investments were incorporated through the Dutch subsidiary 
(in the case of ExxonMobil, after 21 February 2006) but not before that date. If the tribunal had found that the 
domestic law provided jurisdiction, the firms would likely have been awarded compensation for events before 
that date as well. 
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not necessarily lead to additional investment (Bonnitcha, Poulsen & Waibel, 2017, pp. 158–166). 
Third, no developed states have ever consented to arbitration in their domestic laws, so 
governments are not emulating successful examples (UNCTAD, 2016). Fourth, there are no 
domestic constituencies likely to lobby for investment arbitration, since it disadvantages 
domestic investors by giving foreigners a right that citizens do not have (Bonnitcha et al., 2017, 
pp. 181–192; Betz & Pond, 2019). So why do any governments mention investor-state arbitration 
in their domestic laws? 
We argue that governments incorporate arbitration into their domestic laws because 
doing so was labelled ‘international best practice’ by specialist units at the World Bank. To make 
our argument, we draw on literature about analytic institutions within international organizations 
(IOs)—the specialist units that design metrics to assess country performance, define international 
best practice, and write templates for policy reforms (Broome & Seabrooke, 2012; Broome, 
Homolar, & Kranke, 2018; Cooley & Snyder, 2015; Davis, Fisher, Kingsbury, & Merry, 2012; 
Kelley & Simmons, 2015, 2019; Merry, Davis, & Kingsbury, 2015; Sharman, 2012; Vetterlein, 
2012).  
This literature often highlights that IO legitimacy and influence rest on claims of 
universality; the very idea of international best practices asserts that a certain set of practices is 
best anywhere. Yet what we observe and explain is asymmetric diffusion—a policy is framed as 
universal best practice but only recommended to a subset of states. This is novel; even previous 
scholarship that considers how political contestation shapes IO policy recommendations 
(Chorev, 2013; Kentikelenis and Seabrooke, 2017) does not consider asymmetric diffusion.  
Analytic institutions within the World Bank have framed references to investor-state 
arbitration in domestic law as a policy solution since the 1960s. These analytic institutions have 
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collected domestic investment laws, defined best practice, and written templates for domestic 
investment laws in the decades since then. Therefore we hypothesize that after a government 
receives advice on reforming its domestic investment law from a particular analytic institution 
within the World Bank Group, the Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS), that 
government’s law is more likely to mention arbitration. 
We apply a mixed-methods framework to examine the extent to which our argument 
explains the variation in domestic laws, comparing it against three alternative explanations for 
why governments consent to arbitration: in order to make credible commitments, in response to 
coercion, and in response to bureaucratic incentives. We first test these arguments using event 
history analysis, with two unique datasets on World Bank technical assistance and domestic 
investment laws. We find that the presence of a FIAS mission is an exceptionally strong 
predictor of domestic investment laws with arbitration clauses, even when controlling for lending 
and other IO involvement. Second, we illustrate how the causal mechanism works in a case study 
of the Kyrgyz Republic’s 2003 investment law, which we select as a typical case.  
In the next section, we elaborate our argument and compare it with existing explanations 





Argument: IO Analytic Institutions and Asymmetric Diffusion 
International organizations are often conceptualized as unitary actors, but in reality, many IOs 
are sprawling organizations composed of sub-units with different identities, purposes, and 
organizational cultures. Here we focus on analytic institutions, following Broome and Seabrooke 
(2012). Analytic institutions are specialist units within wider IOs that define policy problems and 
solutions, usually by defining indicators and best practices. Analytic institutions provide the tools 
through which IOs make states more legible, by replacing idiosyncratic local arrangements with 
benchmarked, coherent, and compatible national systems (Scott, 1998; Broome & Seabrooke, 
2007, 2012). Their work embodies the notion of bureaucratic universalism, that is, bureaucracies 
are supposed to generate universal rules because technical knowledge is transferable across 
circumstances (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004, p. 39).  
IO analytic institutions are important actors in the current ‘ratings craze’ (Cooley & 
Snyder, 2015); many rankings, like the World Bank Doing Business indicators, emerge from IO 
analytic institutions. Therefore, analytic institutions have come under increased scrutiny in the 
growing research on rankings, indicators, and benchmarks (Best, 2017; Broome & Quirk, 2015; 
Broome et al., 2018; Clegg, 2010; Cooley & Snyder, 2015; Davis et al., 2012; Kelley & 
Simmons, 2015, 2019; Merry et al., 2015). Much of the literature on IOs and ranking-based 
benchmarking focuses on how states respond to the indicators. Rationalist approaches suggest 
states respond strategically, either by paying attention only to the rankings that might inflict 
economic damage, such as credit ratings, or by ‘teaching to the test’ and targeting indicators to 
improve their scores without adopting new behaviors (Cooley & Snyder, 2015, pp. 4–5). 
Approaches emphasizing socialization and reputational concerns find that ratings lead officials to 
internalize certain priorities or to exert influence through naming and shaming (Kelley & 
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Simmons, 2015, 2019). IO analytic institutions do more than create benchmarks, and we focus 
on a policy that is defined by an IO analytic institution as best practice, but not included in any 
benchmark or ranking, in order to study other means of influence.  
Instead of benchmarks, we focus on policy templates written by IO analytic institutions. 
Templates, or policy documents that define international best practices, come in several forms. 
One form of template is a public text that governments are invited to use as the model for 
domestic legislation, like the model laws designed by the UN Commission on International 
Trade Law on issues like commercial arbitration (1985, updated 2006) and cross-border 
insolvency (1997).3 IOs also issue model texts for international treaties, like the model tax 
convention issued by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, which is the basis for most double 
taxation treaties (Sharman, 2012, p. 27). Templates can also take the form of guidelines or 
handbooks issued by IOs. For instance, since 1979 the OECD has regularly updated guidelines 
on transfer pricing to encourage standardization (Sharman, 2012, p. 26). The core trait of a 
template is that it identifies best practices, as defined by the IO analytic institution. 
The process of constructing a template usually starts with collecting information on 
national policies. Deciding what information to collect necessarily advances certain values at the 
expense of others, as Vetterlein (2012) illustrates in her examination of debates within the World 
Bank on how to measure poverty. Analytic institutions define best practice by identifying or 
articulating a policy and then labelling this policy as the preferred solution to a common problem 
facing member states (Broome & Seabrooke, 2012, p. 7). Deciding what counts as a policy 
problem and constructing policy solutions is the crux of analytic institutions’ work. Examining 
how they diagnose problems and construct solutions can ‘provide us with a stronger grasp of 
 




how IOs seek to influence and engineer change within their member states’ (Broome & 
Seabrooke, 2012, p. 5).  
The ability of IO analytic institutions to influence member states rests on the IO’s 
reputation and expert authority, which, in turn, rest on claims of universal technical knowledge 
(Barnett & Finnemore, 2004; Halliday, Block-Lieb, & Carruthers, 2010). IO templates or scripts 
are strategic devices that work to build an IO’s legitimacy through rhetoric (Halliday et al., 
2010). The effectiveness and legitimacy of a template or script is affected by its adoption, which 
can be thought of as ‘a quantitative criterion (i.e. how many nations signed a convention) [and] a 
qualitative criterion (i.e. which nations have adopted global norms)’ (Halliday et al., 2010, p. 
82). An IO may use the adoption of a recommendation or template by many states or by 
particular states to bolster its legitimacy claims and validate its template.  
An IO is not able to invoke the practice of powerful states or wide adoption in an instance 
of asymmetric diffusion. Asymmetric advice undermines an IO’s rhetorical claims about 
universal best practice, which in turn undermines the credibility and legitimacy of an IO’s 
recommendations. If it is damaging for an IO’s legitimacy, why does asymmetric diffusion 
occur?  
Examining the incentives and constraints produced by an IO’s institutional environment 
can explain many puzzling aspects of IO behavior (Cooley and Ron, 2002, p. 6), including 
asymmetric diffusion. Cooley and Ron (2002, p. 6) argue that ‘dysfunctional organizational 
behavior is likely to be a rational response to systematic and predictable institutional pressures’. 
They highlight how shifts in donor strategies toward competitive contract tenders, one-year 
renewable contracts, and increased reliance on consultants contribute to dysfunctional IO 
behavior (Cooley and Ron, 2002, pp. 6–13). When an IO or analytic institution faces contract or 
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funding renewal pressure, it has incentives to be responsive to donor priorities and may not be 
designed with channels for feedback from recipient states or contestation over its policy 
recommendations; these characteristics enable asymmetric diffusion. Growing IO reliance on 
consultants also discourages change: ‘the logic of consultancies is that there is a high premium 
on getting future contracts, which means that policy recommendations should not “rock the 
boat”’ (Seabrooke and Sending, 2019, p. 4).   
Identifying who participates in defining best practice, another aspect of an IO’s 
institutional environment, can also help to explain the persistence of asymmetric diffusion. In 
their research on bankruptcy law, Block-Lieb and Halliday (2017, pp. 4, 10) find that ‘how 
international commercial law is made influences what law is made’ and ‘the who of lawmaking 
is inseparable from the how’. Similarly, Kentikelenis and Seabrooke (2017, p. 1071) ‘zoom in on 
which scientific and political actors are included in, or excluded from, global normmaking 
processes’. They argue that focusing on power asymmetries can also ‘explain instances of 
widespread script institutionalization, despite contention in the countries affected and from other 
international organizations involved’ (Kentikelenis and Seabrooke, 2017, pp. 1083–4). 
Asymmetric diffusion is likeliest in contexts where policy feedback from weaker actors is 
limited.  
Even when they contain ‘contested policy ideas as best practices’, the templates written 
by IOs ‘achieve legitimacy — and thereby policy traction — by piggybacking on the status of 
the organizations that produce them as expert evaluators’ (Broome et al., 2018, p. 516). 
Templates can be tied to IO lending or structural power, but in this paper we seek to isolate the 
influence of templates from coercive means of influence available to IOs, such as future lending, 
loan conditionality, or blacklisting. We study a policy that has never been a condition for a loan 
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or grounds for blacklisting, in order to focus on subtler means of influence. To examine how 
templates spread, we build on earlier scholarship that presents IOs as ‘teachers’ (Finnemore, 
1993; Jacoby, 2001) and actors that validate and promote certain norms (Park & Vetterlein, 
2010). We focus on one means of influence: technical assistance provided by IO analytic 
institutions. The next section outlines how the World Bank defined best practice in domestic 
investment laws and how a part of the World Bank disseminates those practices through 
technical assistance.  
The World Bank’s Definition of Best Practices in Domestic Investment Laws 
The World Bank is the only IO that has ever recommended governments provide access to 
investor-state arbitration in their domestic investment laws. In 1965, the World Bank Executive 
Directors released a report that mentioned governments could provide access to investor-state 
arbitration in their domestic laws (Parra, 2017, p. 81). The Directors issued the 1965 report to 
increase awareness of a multilateral treaty drafted by the World Bank which creates a procedure 
and secretariat to administer investor-state arbitration proceedings.4 In the 1960s and 1970s, this 
secretariat started collecting the domestic investment laws of developing countries (Parra, 2017, 
pp. 139–141).  
In the mid-1980s, World Bank officials began working to define best practices for 
domestic investment laws. First a survey of domestic investment laws was conducted (Parra, 
1992). Then Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment were drafted; a purpose 
of these Guidelines was to serve as a template of best practices for domestic investment laws, 
and the Guidelines mention investor-state arbitration (Shihata, 1991, p. 499; Shihata, 1993).  
 
4 The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, which set 
up the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). 
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Also during the 1980s, FIAS, a new agency within the World Bank Group, was created. 
FIAS, a small organization, has been renamed and restructured, but its mandate has remained the 
same: ‘to provide advice on host country policies that affect the flow of productive private 
investment’ (FIAS, 2006, p. 8). FIAS is the analytic institution that we focus on, and in 
particular, their domestic investment law advice. The purpose of FIAS’s investment law reform 
work is to ‘help countries attract and retain foreign investment by recommending legislative 
reforms’ (FIAS, 2006, p. 20).  
The purpose and procedure of this technical assistance have remained the same over time. 
The 2006 Annual Report notes that ‘FIAS advice on investment legislation starts with a review 
of existing or draft legislation, in which we identify eventual flaws and inconsistencies and offer 
concrete recommendations based on “international best practices”’ (FIAS, 2006, p. 20). Officials 
also use best practice to describe their work: ‘I think the value added of the World Bank is that 
we work all around the world […] so we can get all these good practices that have been working 
elsewhere’.5  
The initial best practice template was the 1992 Guidelines, mentioned above. Poulsen 
(2015, p. 79), writing about the 1990s, argues that FIAS’s ‘main policy was to focus on 
enshrining the World Bank Guidelines into domestic laws’. Since then, the Guidelines have been 
extended into a longer handbook. The current FIAS template, the 2010 Investment Law Reform 
Handbook, states: 
Good practice is for the investment code to recognize/guarantee that disputes arising in 
connection with investment […] will be settled promptly through consultations and negotiations 
between the parties to the dispute, or through procedures for arbitration in accordance with the 
 
5 Interview, FIAS A, 2019. 
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host country’s international commitments or through other arbitration procedures acceptable to 
both parties. It is not advisable to include in the provision a mandatory period of negotiations 
before filing for arbitration (FIAS, 2010, p. 53). 
The Handbook urges governments to provide access to arbitration. In interviews, FIAS officials 
provided further explanation, which was consistent with the Handbook:  
To put things in perspective I think we advocate for ISDS [investor-state dispute settlement] as a 
good international practice. Also to ensure alignment with IIAs [international investment 
agreements].6 
I think the broad idea regarding investor rights is to ensure [the law] either gives rights that are 
higher than those […] already available in IIAs or BITs [bilateral investment treaties], or to match 
them. That is the core message from our side. […] We say that it is always better to have your 
domestic law in alignment with your international laws that you have already accepted like 15–20 
years ago in the form of a BIT.7  
We are not arguing that FIAS officials instruct national officials to insert access to arbitration in 
their domestic laws; rather, that their framing of arbitration influences how national officials see 
it. National officials are likely to conclude that providing arbitration access is best practice and 
that its benefits will likely outweigh the risks. In fact, FIAS officials report that they often have 
to reassure states that are afraid of arbitration cases: ‘we have to tell them that states have won 
more times in ISDS cases than have private investors.’8 This leads to our hypothesis: Receiving 
technical assistance on investment law reform from FIAS increases the probability that a state 
will consent to arbitration in its domestic investment laws. 
 
6 Interview, FIAS A, 2019. 
7 Interview, FIAS B, 2019. 
8 Interview, FIAS B, 2019. 
 
11 
If our hypothesis is supported, we will observe a relationship between governments 
receiving advice from FIAS and laws that mention arbitration, across a range of countries. Yet, 
how do we know that governments receive technical assistance first, and then start remaking 
their investment laws? In the sections below, we explore possible selection effects and 
sequencing. 
Selection: Who Asks for Technical Assistance?  
Formally, governments must ask FIAS to provide technical assistance. This leads to concerns 
about endogeneity and selection bias. Have governments already decided to embark on reforms 
to their investment laws when they ask FIAS for assistance?  
Our interviews with FIAS officials and country officials suggest that FIAS technical 
assistance missions are initiated for a variety of reasons, most of which do not relate to the 
government’s willingness to undertake policy change in hopes of attracting foreign investment. 
In other words, countries rarely self-select into assistance; they are selected because the World 
Bank is operating other projects there or because a donor suggests funding a project in that 
country. In fact, we have not been able to identify a single instance in which a government 
started work on a new domestic investment law and then asked FIAS for assistance.  
In practice, the idea for FIAS assistance emerges externally, often through suggestions by 
officials in other arms of the World Bank Group. As one official put it:  
We have other [World Bank] teams that are working on these areas, and then they say [to the 
government], ‘Well now you have addressed this, you have to address the broader investment 
climate aspects, to ensure that you get the maximum benefit’, and they refer us. The country 
makes the decisions though, to engage us.9  
 
9 Interview, FIAS B, 2019.  
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World Bank country offices also provide information to governments about the technical 
assistance services that the World Bank Group can provide:  
The approach is, or should be, demand-driven and not supply-driven. However, of course, as I 
mentioned, the World Bank has local offices all around the world. And these local offices, their 
work is to keep our relationship with the government. They produce reports and analysis, they go 
to meetings with the government, to workshops […] so the government, whenever they feel they 
need assistance on something, they can reach out to the World Bank colleagues in the region.10  
Capacity-constrained governments face a complicated landscape with many donor 
agencies, IOs, and other actors; they are not necessarily aware of FIAS. World Bank country 
offices advertise or remind governments of available technical assistance. Moreover, FIAS 
advisory missions often overlap with World Bank lending operations. These countries do not 
embark on investment law reform and then contact FIAS; the assistance emerges as part of larger 
World Bank operations. 
FIAS advisers are often invited to countries shortly after the end of armed conflict or in 
the early years after independence, as part of larger World Bank and donor programs in those 
countries. For instance, Sierra Leone’s civil war raged until 2002, and by 2003, FIAS advisers 
were in-country. Similarly, FIAS began advisory work in Timor-Leste immediately after 
independence from Indonesia was restored in 2002 (See Table 1). FIAS strategy documents state 
that its ‘priority clients’ are ‘fragile and conflict-affected situations, low-income countries, and 
Sub-Saharan Africa’ (FIAS, 2014, p. 7).  
Donors can also influence which countries receive assistance. FIAS is donor-funded and 
some donors earmark which countries they want the money to be used for; donors may even 
 
10 Interview, FIAS A, 2019. 
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allocate funds for specific types of technical assistance, including FIAS investment law reform 
work. An official gave the following hypothetical example: ‘They say I allocate 40 percent of 
this project to business regulations, and then I allocate 20 percent to investment policy and then 
another 30 percent to sectors’.11 This is further evidence that although governments do formally 
invite FIAS to provide assistance, the impetus for investment law reform often does not come 
from them.  
The countries that receive FIAS assistance are characterized by capacity constraints that 
make robust scrutiny of an IO template less likely. Broome and Seabrooke (2015, pp. 960–1) 
observe that states differ along two dimensions, policy capacity, defined as the ability to 
implement a policy, and policy space, defined as the range of thinkable policy options. These 
dimensions create four types of states: (I) lower-capacity rogue states, (II) lower-capacity states 
that are ‘eager to embrace global “best practice” policies without the capacity to adapt them to 
the local environment’, (III) higher-capacity states innovating policies, and (IV) higher-capacity 
states involved in IO trainings (Broome and Seabrooke 2015, p. 961). When asymmetric 
diffusion occurs, the IO templates should appear most frequently (and perhaps only) in this 
second type of state, defined by eagerness to implement best practice and by capacity constraints 
that make scrutiny or adaptation less likely.  
Sequence: Technical Assistance as a Process  
We conceptualize technical assistance as a process; international actors bring with them a 
template of best practices, which are transmitted and translated in an iterative relationship.  
FIAS projects on domestic law reform begin with the project being funded and an 
external consultant and local lawyer being hired. External consultants are often former 
 
11 Interview, FIAS B, 2019. 
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ambassadors or retired trade negotiators, or they have worked for international organizations.12 
These consultants often work for FIAS repeatedly, and may work on drafting domestic 
investment laws in several countries.13 The consultant and possibly FIAS officials travel to the 
country for initial scoping exercises. There is a related diagnostic stage in which FIAS officials 
or consultants review relevant national laws, administrative processes, and investment treaties 
agreed by the country. One official described this stage succinctly: ‘We review the law up 
against best practices’.14 Then there are consultations with ‘stakeholders in the private and public 
sectors, to identify issues in the legal framework and build reform consensus’.15  
The local lawyer usually writes the first draft of the new investment law, using the 
Investment Law Reform Handbook as a template as well as example clauses suggested by FIAS. 
Then, a draft of the law is sent to FIAS in Washington; FIAS reviews it and provides comments. 
FIAS officials emphasized that they do not write laws at any point, but they do provide detailed 
comments whenever there is a draft.16 
In many governments, a working group is set up to discuss a new investment law. The 
timing, mandate, and composition of working groups vary, but international actors often 
participate. When FIAS is involved, the external consultant and local lawyer will participate. 
Officials from other IOs may participate, as well as representatives of foreign firms or industry 
groups, foreign law firms, and aid agency officials. For instance, the working group that drafted 
Kosovo’s investment law (which did not include FIAS, because Kosovo is not a World Bank 
member) included representatives from the American aid agency USAID, the American 
 
12 Interview, FIAS B, 2019. 
13 Interview, Kyrgyz B, 2019. 
14 Interview, FIAS B, 2019. 
15 Interview, FIAS B, 2019. 
16 Interview, FIAS A, 2019; Interview, FIAS B, 2019. 
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Chamber of Commerce, and the Kosovo Chamber of Commerce.17 When FIAS is involved, the 
working group may send drafts of the law to FIAS in Washington for review. FIAS Annual 
Reports frequently report providing comments to a government in multiple years when a new 
investment law is being drafted.  
The final step in most countries is parliamentary review and debate. Even in this step, 
external actors may have influence. For instance, the Bosnian investment law was preceded by a 
letter from the United Nations High Representative, who noted that the House of Representatives 
had ‘removed the Draft Law from the proposed agenda’ but that he believed doing so was 
‘against the best interest of Bosnia and Herzegovina’. Therefore, he wrote, ‘I have decided to put 
into force the Law on the Policy of Foreign Direct Investment in Bosnia and Herzegovina’.18 
This extreme case is a reminder that FIAS and other providers of technical assistance often work 
in contexts in which domestic deliberation may be limited or curtailed.  
Alternative Explanations 
With one exception (Poulsen, 2015), existing research on domestic investment laws is limited to 
policy reviews of state practices (UNCTAD, 2016; Bonnitcha, 2017) and legal analysis (Parra, 
1997; Caron, 2010; Potestà, 2011; Hepburn, 2018). Yet many of the arguments advanced to 
explain why governments sign investment treaties with arbitration clauses may be relevant for 
why governments enact domestic investment laws with the same arbitration provisions. 
Therefore, we review three explanations for why governments sign investment treaties with 
arbitration provisions.  
 
17 Kosovo official, personal communication, December 19, 2018. 
18 Letter from Carlos Westendorp, High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, to Slobodan Bijelic and Avdo 
Campara, ‘Decision imposing the Draft Law on the Policy of Foreign Direct Investment in BiH’, 3 May 1998. 
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The first explanation is that developing countries are engaged in a rational competition 
for capital, and governments provide access to arbitration in order to increase the credibility of 
their commitments to investors and to compensate for weak institutions (Guzman, 1998; Elkins, 
Guzman, & Simmons, 2006). If this explanation applies in the context of domestic investment 
laws, we should see a correlation between lower-quality domestic institutions and laws with 
arbitration access.  
The second major explanation is power-based. Allee and Peinhardt (2014) find that 
access to arbitration in a bilateral treaty is determined by the degree of power asymmetry 
between the bargaining states. Since domestic laws do not emerge in bilateral bargaining 
contexts, we adapt this argument and identify two possible sources of coercion in domestic law 
drafting.  
First, IOs may exert coercive influence. Gwynn (2016) argues that the structural power 
exercised by IOs is important to understand the spread of investor-state arbitration. We 
operationalize this type of coercive influence with explicit conditionality. If a new domestic 
investment law is a condition that must be met for a loan or loan disbursement from the World 
Bank, then coercion is at work. If we find a link between World Bank lending and domestic laws 
with arbitration, that would suggest our explanation needs to be revised for a more coercive one. 
Second, foreign firms or other states may exert pressure on governments to change their 
laws. Some scholars find evidence that home states are lobbied by domestic firms who seek 
arbitration access (Allee & Peinhardt, 2014; Maurer, 2013; Wellhausen, 2015) while others find 
less evidence of lobbying (Gertz, 2018; Poulsen, 2015; St John, 2018). We think that if firms 
lobby their host governments for access to arbitration, they are more likely to lobby for access to 
be written into their contracts. This is much easier than pushing for an overhaul of domestic 
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legislation. Similarly, if another state seeks access to arbitration for their investors, they are 
likely to negotiate a treaty instead of pushing for new domestic legislation. Nevertheless, if this 
explanation is accurate, we should see a correlation between smaller markets and laws with 
arbitration access.  
At first glance, these two alternate explanations, credible commitments and coercion, 
seem to have limited explanatory value regarding domestic investment laws. Figure 1 shows the 
distribution of states that have mentioned to arbitration in their domestic investment laws and 
those that have not, sorted on the quality of their domestic property rights institutions and their 
market size.19 While it is striking that no OECD state has ever mentioned arbitration in its 
domestic laws, the countries that have consented to arbitration are not clustered in any obvious 
way, when ordered on these two dimensions. 
 
 
19 To measure property rights institutions, we use the Property rights index from the Varieties of Democracy data 
project (Coppedge et al., 2018, p. 237). For the GDP data, see Section 3. We use the average values for each 




Figure 1. Mention of arbitration in domestic laws, property rights institutions, and GDP 
(average values 1986-2015) 
 
The third major explanation focuses on officials’ perceptions of investment treaties. 
Poulsen (2015) argues that government officials initially underestimated the costs and 
overestimated the benefits of investment treaties. Jandhyala, Henisz, & Mansfield (2011) argue 
that how government officials perceive treaties with arbitration changes over time. While in 
earlier decades officials signed investment treaties in hopes of attracting investment, by the 
1990s, officials signed investment treaties because they had become an accepted norm.  
We focus on the dynamic aspect of these explanations, that government officials can 
learn about investor-state arbitration and change their views over time. Poulsen and Aisbett 
(2013) show that once governments face their first investor-state arbitration claim, their 
propensity to sign investment treaties decreases significantly. If this explanation applies to 
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domestic investment laws, we should see a correlation between fewer treaties or fewer arbitration 
claims faced, and laws with arbitration clauses.  
In our analysis, we include indicators that capture each of these alternative explanations. 
To account for domestic institutions, we use measures that capture the quality of regulatory 
agencies and of government accountability; to account for potential coercion, we use World 
Bank lending data and measures of states’ overall market size; and to account for potential 
learning effects, we use measures of actual exposure to arbitration. We comment on the 
independent effect of all these variables, but our primary interest is the explanatory value of 




Research design and analysis 
Quantitative analysis – establishing a link between FIAS and arbitration clauses 
Dependent variable: arbitration clauses in domestic investment laws 
Our dependent variable is the time until adoption of a domestic investment law with access to 
arbitration, measured in days. We observe all World Bank member states, starting in 1986 when 
FIAS was established, or later if they joined the World Bank after 1986. Our event of interest is 
the passage of a domestic investment law with an arbitration clause.  
We use two operationalizations: (I) laws that mention international arbitration at any 
arbitral fora, and (II) laws we are reasonably certain that tribunals would interpret as providing 
consent and direct access to arbitration, based on published legal interpretations and previous 
tribunal decisions on jurisdiction. All laws coded in category (II) will necessarily also be in 
category (I). The first measure is straightforward and replicable. The second is more meaningful 
because it attempts to isolate if a government thought it was providing foreign investors with 
access to arbitration, but it is also more subjective. We discuss both operationalizations in 
Appendix A, including the legal scholarship and decisions we used to code category (II).20  
Within our sample period (1986–2015), we identify 74 laws coming into force that 
mention international arbitration, of which 42 laws are coded as providing probable consent to 
arbitration at some point in time.21 Figure 2 shows these developments over time. 
 
20 Appendix A reproduces the dispute resolution clause of each law we coded, with an explanation of our coding and 
the sources used. 
21 A few countries have domestic investment laws with arbitration clauses that came into force before 1986: Egypt 
(1974), Sri Lanka (1978) and the Republic of the Congo (1982). As discussed in Appendix A, we exclude these 
countries from our sample, even though we have anecdotal evidence connecting these provisions to the presence 
of external advisers, including World Bank officials. To the best of our knowledge, Egypt’s law is the first 
investment law that provides consent to investor–state arbitration, but Fatouros (1962, p. 186–187) mentions that 
a handful of national petroleum laws included provisions on arbitration and notes a 1953 Greek law that outlines 




Figure 2. Developments in domestic investment laws enacted, five-year intervals, authors’ 
own coding 
 
Independent Variable: FIAS advice on reforming domestic investment laws 
Our independent variable is a binary measure of the in-country presence of FIAS technical 
advisory missions. We coded the presence of a FIAS mission, using FIAS’s annual reports, 
which list all advisory projects finalized in any given year.22 The annual reports distinguish 
different types of advisory activity, which enables us to single out FIAS projects that gave advice 
on domestic investment laws. Since drafting and implementing legislation is a process that can 
take years, we employ two versions of our independent variable. The first measures whether 
 
22 We used FIAS’s annual reports to identify technical assistance missions going back to 1999, and an internal 
evaluation of FIAS’s first 13 years of operation to identify technical assistance missions from 1986 to 1998 
(World Bank, 1995; World Bank, 2004, pp. 33–36). The annual reports are available through the World Bank’s 
document portal, for instance (World Bank, 2000b, 2001). Interviews with FIAS officials confirmed that all 
projects are listed in their annual reports (Interview, FIAS A, 2019; Interview, FIAS B, 2019). 
 
22 
FIAS finalized a project on that country’s investment law in any of the previous three years, and 
the second, in any of the previous five years. So, when FIAS reports to have concluded an 
advisory project on domestic legal reform in Afghanistan in 2004, the first version of our 
variable is coded as 1 from 2004–2006, while the second version is coded as 1 for 2004–2008. 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of completed FIAS advisory projects on domestic 
investment laws over time. The peak of advisory activity occurred in the late 1990s, with 18 
reform projects on domestic investment laws completed in 1998 and 13 projects in 2000. While 
the number of projects fluctuates, FIAS’s advice to states has remained consistent over time: 
providing access to arbitration in domestic law is best practice. 
 






Before we present the results from our event history analysis, we present the bivariate link 
between FIAS technical assistance and arbitration clauses in domestic investment laws. Table 1 
lists all countries that have received FIAS technical advice or passed an investment law that 
mentions or consents to arbitration between 1986 and 2015.23  
The link between FIAS and investment-law-making is striking. Of the 74 World Bank 
member states that have passed an investment law mentioning or consenting to arbitration after 
1986, 30 countries received investment law advice from FIAS prior to passing the law (grey 
rows). For the large majority of these countries (27 of 30), it took less than three years from 
FIAS’s previous advisory project until they passed their investment laws. Moreover, almost 50 
percent (30/65) of the states that received investment law advice from FIAS included arbitration 
in their laws. That is remarkably high, given the potential for domestic opposition to arbitration 









Time from last FIAS 
mission to law 
Afghanistan 2004 2005 2005 1 year 
Albania   1993 1993   
Algeria   1993     
Armenia 1999; 2000; 2003       
Azerbaijan 2003; 2005 1992     
Belarus   2013 2013   
Benin   1990 1990   
Bhutan 2002; 2005       
Bolivia 2002 1990     
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998; 2015 1998   0 years 
Burkina Faso   1995 1995   
 
23 Table 1 shows a subset of the states we observe in our analysis, which includes all World Bank member states 
except the four that provided consent prior to 1986, as discussed in Appendix A. 
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Burundi   2008 2008   
Cabo Verde   1993 1993   
Cambodia 1994; 2002; 2004 1994   0 years 
Cameroon   1990 1990   
Central African Republic   2001     
Chad   2008     
China 1998 1988     
Colombia   2000     
Comoros 2006       
Costa Rica 1998       
Côte d’Ivoire   1995 1995   
Dem. People's Rep. of Korea        
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 2001; 2002 2002 2002 0 years 
Dominican Republic 1998       
Ecuador   1997     
El Salvador 1994; 1998 1999 1999 1 year 
Equatorial Guinea 1992; 1993       
Fiji 1998; 2004 2004   0 years 
Gambia   2010 2010   
Georgia   1996 1996   
Ghana 1993 1994 1994 1 year 
Guinea   1987 1987   
Guinea-Bissau 
1997; 1998; 2006; 
2010 
      
Guyana 2004 2004 2004 0 years 
Honduras   2011 2011   
Hungary 1991       
Indonesia 2006; 2007 2007   0 years 
Iran   2002     
Iraq   2006     
Jordan 2003 1994 1994   
Kazakhstan 1998 1994 1994   
Kenya 2000; 2005       
Kuwait 1998; 2000 2013   13 years 
Kyrgyzstan 1998; 1999; 2001 2003 2003 2 years 
Liberia 2010 2010 2010 0 years 
Libya   2010     
Lithuania 1999 1999 1999 0 years 
Macedonia 2000       
Madagascar 2007; 2008 2008 2008 0 years 
Malawi 1992 1992     
Maldives 2003       
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Mali 2012 1991 1991   
Marshall Islands 1998       
Mauritania 1999; 2002 2002 2002 0 years 
Micronesia 2000       
Moldova 2004 2004   0 years 
Mongolia 1998; 2001; 2003 2013 2013 10 years 
Montenegro   2011     
Morocco 2001       
Mozambique   1993     
Namibia 1992 1990     
Nepal   1992 1992   
Nicaragua 1998 2000 2000 2 years 
Niger   1989 1989   
Nigeria   1995 1995   
Oman   1994     
Palau 2001; 2003       
Panama 2002       
Papua New Guinea 1989 1992   3 years 
Paraguay   1992     
Qatar 2000 2000   0 years 
Romania 1998       
Russia 1994; 1998; 2000 1999   1 year 
Rwanda 1998 2015   17 years 
Sao Tome and Principe 2001       
Saudi Arabia 2001       
Sierra Leone 1997; 2003 2004 2004 1 year 
Slovakia 2000       
Solomon Islands 
1997; 2000; 2004; 
2005; 2006 
2005   0 years 
Somalia   1987 1987   
South Sudan   2009 2009   
Sudan   2013     
Suriname 2005       
Swaziland 1997       
Syria 2004; 2007 2007 2007 0 years 
Tajikistan   2007     
Tanzania 1999; 2000 1997     
Timor-Leste 2003; 2004 2005   1 year 
Togo   1989 1989   
Tonga 2000 2002   2 years 
Turkey 2000, 2003 2003   0 years 
Uganda 1998; 2000 1991     
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Ukraine 1998       
Uzbekistan   1998     
Venezuela   1999     
Vietnam 1993       
Yemen 2007 2010 2010 3 years 
Zambia 1993; 2004 2006   2 years 
Table 1. World Bank member states that have received FIAS advice and/or enacted laws with an 
arbitration clause between 1986–2015, authors’ own coding 
 
Since our dependent variable is measured as time until law adoption, and many of the 
country spells we observe are right-censored (i.e., the country in question never mentioned or 
consented to arbitration in a domestic investment law), we use event history analysis (Box-
Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004). Event history models estimate hazard rates, defined as the rate of 
occurrence of an event – in our case mention of or consent to arbitration – which is appropriate 
for making inferences about the duration of events in the face of right-censoring.  
Moreover, using the event history framework is a good estimation strategy to incorporate 
time dependence in analyses of law adoption or diffusion (Strang, 1991). We estimate semi-
parametric Cox proportional hazard models that leave the duration dependence unspecified, 
because we have no assumptions about the shape of the time baseline hazard (Box-Steffensmeier 
& Jones, 2004, p. 47), and because faulty specification of duration-dependency can bias 
inferences (Golub, 2008). The Cox model assumes that the effects of covariates do not vary with 
time (the proportional hazard assumption). Tests indicate that none of the covariates in our 
models violate this assumption.24  
Our analysis begins in 1986, the year FIAS became operational within the World Bank, 
and includes investment laws passed until 2015. Our unit of analysis is country-year, and we 
 
24 We used Schoenfeld residuals (stphtest in STATA) to test the proportionality for each covariate.  
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observe all World Bank member states (except the three countries that passed domestic laws with 
arbitration clauses before 1986). Countries exit our sample on the day they pass a domestic 
investment law with an arbitration clause.25 For countries that passed multiple laws between 
1986 and 2015, we let them exit on the day they passed their first law with an arbitration clause. 
All models are estimated using robust standard errors clustered on countries and using the Efron 
method for handling tied events (Hertz-Picciotto & Rockhill, 1997). 
As discussed in the alternative explanations section, there are other explanations for why 
states include arbitration clauses in their domestic laws. Some of these factors may also 
confound the relationship between FIAS advice and domestic investment laws.  
First, because we expect countries with well-developed domestic institutions to be less 
likely both to seek technical assistance from FIAS and to enact domestic investment laws, we use 
the Rigorous and impartial public administration variable from the Varieties of Democracy (V-
Dem) data project (Coppedge et al., 2018, p. 159) to control for the quality of regulatory 
agencies. For similar reasons, we control for the strength of civil society and general government 
accountability. We use the Accountability index from V-Dem, which captures civil society’s and 
the media’s oversight over government processes, as well as vertical and horizontal checks on 
the executive (Coppedge et al., 2018, pp. 223–224).  
To control for the fact that larger, more developed economies should be less likely to 
solicit technical assistance from the World Bank and less likely to give foreign investors 
preferential treatment, we control for countries’ market size (using the log of GDP) and level of 
development (using the log of GDP per capita).26 Since newly independent countries and post-
 
25 For laws where we have not found records of the exact date of passage, we use the year midpoint, July 1. 
26 These data are taken from the International Political Economy Data Resource (Graham & Tucker, 2019), who use 




conflict countries are more likely both to seek technical assistance and to adapt their legislation 
to facilitate inflows of private capital, we introduce two controls: the log of the number of years 
since a country became independent,27 and the log of regime durability.28 To control for the 
learning effect associated with facing arbitration claims, we control for the cumulative number of 
arbitration claims a state has faced, and the cumulative number of investment agreements with 
arbitration clauses that a state has signed.29 To control for the fact that enacting investment laws 
might be linked to structural power or coercion from the World Bank, we control for the log of 
annual International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) loans.30 Summary 
statistics for all variables, including bivariate correlations between the independent variables, are 
reported in Appendix B. 
  
 
27 We used The World Factbook from the Central Intelligence Agency to identify year of independence. See: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/.  
28 To measure regime durability, we use data on the number of years since the most recent regime change from the 
Polity IV Project (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2018, p. 17).  
29 We compute the cumulative count of arbitration cases and investment agreements by using the list of publicly 
known claims and agreements available on UNCTAD’s investment policy hub, see: 
https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org. UNCTAD’s IIA content mapping allows us to exclude agreements 
without arbitration clauses from our count. 




 DV: Time-to-mention DV: Time-to-consent 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
FIAS, previous 3 yrs.  7.549***   7.971***  
  [4.267,13.355]   [3.828,16.594]  
FIAS, previous 5 yrs.   6.407***   6.703*** 
   [3.693,11.117]   [3.194,14.066] 
Rigorous and imp. adm. 0.836 0.875 0.877 0.914 0.918 0.915 
 [0.630,1.108] [0.660,1.159] [0.666,1.157] [0.613,1.364] [0.604,1.396] [0.608,1.379] 
Accountability 1.286 1.061 1.063 1.410 1.196 1.178 
 [0.817,2.023] [0.688,1.637] [0.686,1.650] [0.782,2.542] [0.654,2.186] [0.650,2.134] 
GDP (log) 1.039 1.097 1.096 0.890 0.928 0.917 
 [0.868,1.243] [0.922,1.305] [0.916,1.311] [0.713,1.111] [0.741,1.160] [0.731,1.150] 
GDP per capita (log) 0.665** 0.688* 0.680** 0.543** 0.582** 0.575** 
 [0.448,0.985] [0.473,1.001] [0.462,1.000] [0.309,0.955] [0.359,0.945] [0.346,0.956] 
Time since indep. (log) 0.675** 0.778* 0.780* 0.831 0.947 0.963 
 [0.494,0.923] [0.583,1.037] [0.582,1.044] [0.583,1.187] [0.679,1.322] [0.688,1.347] 
Regime durability (log) 1.026 1.039 1.046 1.117 1.165 1.172 
 [0.830,1.268] [0.839,1.285] [0.844,1.297] [0.834,1.495] [0.858,1.582] [0.862,1.594] 
Arbitration claims, cum. 0.800* 0.864 0.867 1.011 1.038 1.043 
 [0.637,1.005] [0.703,1.061] [0.702,1.071] [0.915,1.118] [0.972,1.107] [0.976,1.115] 
IIAs signed, cum. 0.991 0.989 0.989 0.977* 0.974* 0.974* 
 [0.978,1.004] [0.975,1.004] [0.975,1.004] [0.953,1.001] [0.947,1.002] [0.947,1.002] 
IBRD loans (log) 1.006 1.007 1.006 0.994 1.007 1.003 
 [0.958,1.055] [0.968,1.048] [0.965,1.049] [0.918,1.075] [0.948,1.069] [0.942,1.068] 
Spells (# of countries) 156 156 156 156 156 156 
Events (# of consents) 70 70 70 35 35 35 
Obs. (country-years) 3475 3475 3475 3989 3989 3989 
AIC 623.258 582.661 586.743 321.059 298.594 301.742 
Note: Cox proportional hazard models, estimates in hazard rates. 95 percent confidence intervals in brackets. * p < 
0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table 2. Cox regression models: Mention of or consent to arbitration in domestic investment 
laws 
 
A series of Cox regression models using our two dependent variables are presented in 
Table 2. Estimates are reported as hazard rates. A hazard rate of greater than one represents a 
positive effect on the odds of a country adopting a domestic law with arbitration, and a hazard 
rate of less than one represents a negative effect. Models 1–3 use time-to-mention of arbitration 
in domestic laws as their dependent variable, and models 4–6 use time-to-consent to arbitration.  
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Models 1 and 4 include only the control variable set. When looking at the effect of the 
variables that capture the three alternative explanations for arbitration clauses in these two 
models, only the two learning variables – the cumulative count of arbitration claims (model 1) 
and the cumulative count of investment agreements (models 4–6) – seem to be linked with the 
adoption rate of domestic laws with arbitration. Increases in both variables (more cases; more 
agreements) are associated with a decrease in the rate of law adoption. Variables related to the 
quality of domestic institutions (regulatory agencies; accountability) and IO coercion (market 
size; IBRD loans) have no independent effect on the adoption of domestic investment laws with 
access to arbitration. 
When looking at the effects of FIAS technical assistance, the results are unequivocal. 
Receiving technical assistance on domestic investment law reform is strongly and significantly 
associated with an increase in the adoption rate of domestic investment laws that mention or 
consent to arbitration. Holding all other variables constant, moving from not receiving FIAS 
advice on domestic legal reform to receiving FIAS advice increases the rate of adoption of laws 
with arbitration clauses by between 650 and 800 percent. Interestingly, the effect of FIAS advice 






Figure 4. Survivor function, mention of arbitration in domestic investment law (model 2 in Table 
2) 
  





Figures 4 and 5 illustrate this relationship by comparing the survivor functions for 
countries that have received FIAS advice on domestic legal reform in one of the previous 3 years 
with those that have not, while holding all other variables at their means. The diverging lines 
show the probability that a country in our sample that passed a domestic investment law 
mentioning or consenting to arbitration is markedly different for those states that received FIAS 
advice.  
We conduct a series of robustness checks, including controlling for additional 
confounders, conducting placebo tests, trying alternative estimation methods, and running 
sensitivity tests. These robustness checks are described in Appendix C. The general tendency is 
that our results are robust to a broad range of checks.  
 
Qualitative analysis – the Kyrgyz Republic’s 2003 Investment Law 
We conducted one case study to illustrate our hypothesis. Since our purpose was confirmatory or 
illustrative, we selected a typical case (Seawright & Gerring, 2008, p. 297). A typical case is 
‘well explained by an existing model’ and is used to better explore the causal mechanisms at 
work in the theorized relationship (Seawright & Gerring, 2008, p. 299). A number of cases are 
well explained by our model; Table 1 above lists 23 countries that passed a new law providing 
consent to arbitration within two years of receiving FIAS advice. Any of those countries could 
have been selected as typical cases. We selected the Kyrgyz Republic, which received technical 
assistance from FIAS in 1998, 1999, and 2001, and then passed an investment law with consent 




As we would expect of a typical case, the Kyrgyz government had low bureaucratic capacity, 
weak property rights institutions, and little experience dealing with foreign investors when this 
investment law was drafted. As the World Bank Country Assistance Strategy put it: ‘Investment 
levels are low, and foreign investors are scarce. The Government is still establishing the 
institutional capacity to deal with the rapid changes in legislation that have been enacted to 
create a market economy’ (World Bank, 1998, p. 1). The 1990s and 2000s were a period of 
political instability; the constitution was significantly reworked or rewritten nine times between 
1993 and 2010 (Liebert & Tiulegenov, 2013, p. 71). Internal World Bank documents describing 
the Kyrgyz government in the 1990s mention insufficient bureaucratic capacity consistently:  
These delays are mainly attributable to the inexperience of the agencies involved and inadequate 
institutional capacity (World Bank, 1998 Annex B8 Attachment, p. 2).  
The [Kyrgyz Republic], as a newly independent country, was struggling to formulate a reform 
program with limited policymaking capacity, weak and inappropriate institutions, and little exposure 
to international institutions or the ways of market economies (World Bank, 2000a, p. 4).  
Poorer and smaller than its Central Asian neighbors, the Kyrgyz Republic joined the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 1998 and Kyrgyz governments in this era were generally eager to 
implement market reforms.  
Involvement of External Actors in Investment Policy Generally 
External actors, including donor agencies and IOs, were heavily involved in the Kyrgyz Republic 
when this law was drafted. The World Bank played a particularly important role. The only major 
foreign investment in the Kyrgyz Republic at the time was the investment made in the Kumtor 
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gold mine, which was insured by the World Bank’s insurance arm (World Bank, 1998, p. 17). 
The World Bank’s International Finance Corporation also provided a US$30 million loan for the 
mine (World Bank, 1998 Annex B8, p. 2). The Kumtor mine was run by a Canadian company, 
but the project was mediated by World Bank officials (World Bank, 1998 Private Sector 
Assessment, p. 6). 
The World Bank and the American aid agency USAID were early providers of technical 
assistance for legal reform related to foreign investment (World Bank, 2000a, p. 12). By 1998, 
other donors had joined them in working on reforming the investment climate in the Kyrgyz 
Republic, including the International Monetary Fund, the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, Germany, Japan, and Switzerland (World Bank, 1998, p. 18). Many donors 
provided technical assistance related to drafting legislation (World Bank, 2009, p. 18). Fifty-five 
percent of all bills under consideration in the spring of 1998 were formulated by IOs or other 
technical assistance providers, a figure that rises to 65% in economic policy (Cooley and Ron, 
2002, p. 19). 
The Kyrgyz Republic’s first investment law, passed in 1997, was drafted with 
considerable World Bank and USAID support. The enactment of this 1997 law was listed as a 
‘main achievement’ in the World Bank report on a loan to the Kyrgyz Republic (World Bank, 
1998 Annex B1, p. 4). This 1997 law does not include arbitration access. 
The FIAS Project 
The first formal FIAS mission on domestic law reform to the Kyrgyz Republic was undertaken 
in 1998. The FIAS project was initiated as part of the wider World Bank country assistance 
strategy for the Kyrgyz Republic, which included an adjustment credit ‘to improve the 
environment for private sector investment’, and noted that FIAS, along with two other World 
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Bank agencies, would ‘be active participants in formulating the policies’ for this improvement 
(World Bank, 1998, p. ii). The formal invitation to FIAS advisers came from the State 
Committee on Foreign Investments (GOSKOMINVEST), which itself was created via technical 
assistance under the 1993–1996 World Bank loan (World Bank, 2000a, p. 4). 
In 1998, FIAS officials undertook diagnostic exercises and consultations. The working 
group within GOSKOMINVEST that would be responsible for drafting the law was created 
then.31 To evaluate our alternative explanations, we probed if other actors advocated for 
arbitration in the law, but did not find evidence of that. Mining companies were the main foreign 
investors interested in the Kyrgyz Republic, and even World Bank documents note that these 
companies sought to negotiate contracts with the government instead of relying on the domestic 
law, for instance: ‘many mining investors will still seek to negotiate separate investment 
agreements with the authorities, which can provide for better investment terms’ (World Bank, 
1998, p. 6).  
The investment law was drafted and considered in parallel to a Law on Arbitration 
Courts, which is ‘mostly based on the UNCITRAL Model Law’ (Korobeinikov, 2017, p. 275). 
This demonstrates that an international template coming into the Kyrgyz Republic and being 
translated into domestic law was an established practice. Kyrgyz actors pointed out that 
international templates are not copied and pasted wholesale, and other models, such as Russian 
and Kazakh laws, are also often looked at, as well as older laws.32 Similarly, Kyrgyz actors note 
that foreign advisers ‘don’t overpower’ locals and that there is often contestation in working 
groups, but it does not take the form of ‘foreign institutions pressuring and locals resisting’, 
rather that the splits usually depend on whose ministries or jobs will be affected by the new 
 
31 Kyrgyz official, Interview A, 2019. 
32 Kyrgyz official, Interview B, 2019. 
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law.33 Yet this same individual noted that sometimes there are not splits within the Kyrgyz 
government. When asked to describe who would be for or against including arbitration in the 
law, they answered: ‘I think the government did not deliberate much in 2003, we didn’t have any 
cases. If we had, all of the Kyrgyz government would have been against it.’34  
By 2000, there was an initial draft of the law, which FIAS officials reviewed (World 
Bank, 2000b). In 2001, FIAS officials undertook a third review, and provided comments on the 
latest draft (World Bank, 2001). The comments that FIAS provides are confidential, but based on 
the publicly available Handbook. 
Pending World Bank Loan  
The investment law passed in March 2003, just before the approval of a large concessional loan 
from the World Bank. The loan was approved May 15, 2003 and the first tranche of this loan was 
released July 31, after being delayed because the Kyrgyz Republic had not yet met the policy 
conditions for disbursement (World Bank, 2009, p. 4). This timing, and Kyrgyz officials’ 
preparing progress reports on their implementation of ‘legislative action plans’ and timetables 
‘for further legal reform actions, satisfactory to [the World Bank]’ at this time, suggest a role for 
structural power or coercion (World Bank, 2000a Annex D, p. 36). The World Bank was 
undoubtedly in a commanding position, but there was no formal conditionality: a new investment 
law was not one of the conditions the Kyrgyz government had to meet for the loan to be released 
(World Bank, 2009, p. 5). In contrast, passing other laws based on international templates were 
formal conditions for the loan, for instance, a procurement law based on an UNCITRAL model 
law (World Bank, 2009, p. 5). Since passing an investment law was not a formal condition for 
 
33 Kyrgyz official, Interview B, 2019. 
34 Kyrgyz official, Interview B, 2019. 
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the loan, our alternative explanation about coercion does not hold.  
Legislative Approval and Subsequent Events 
In the late 1990s, World Bank officials started providing training for Kyrgyz parliamentarians 
about how to prepare and implement legislation related to World Bank work (World Bank, 1998, 
p. 16). Training for parliamentarians was seen as an important way of addressing a widespread 
perception that ‘neither the citizenry at large nor the Parliament in particular have been well 
informed about, much less feel themselves to be stakeholders in, the reform process’ (World 
Bank, 2000a, p. 25). Procedurally, the Parliament (Jogorku Kenesh) must review draft laws 
multiple times, yet often falls short of robust scrutiny: ‘by law they have to review, scrutinize 
and question the drafters. But often they do not, either because they are not interested or because 
they do not have enough time or capacity to do the full research’.35 
Yet the Parliament was capable of unpicking or frustrating certain aspects of laws drafted 
with heavy World Bank involvement, when it sought to do so (Cooley and Ron 2002, p. 21–36). 
An internal World Bank document reports: ‘The Parliament, which has passed an impressive 
body of market-oriented legislation, has on occasion undone key provisions through subsequent 
amendments’ (World Bank, 1998, p. 4). That did not happen with the investment law, which was 
adopted in March 2003, and is often seen as a package with the Law on Arbitration Courts and 
the creation of the International Arbitration Court in the Kyrgyz Republic.  
This case study illustrates our mechanism: FIAS technical assistance introduced a 
domestic law template with consent to arbitration. While there was no coercion from the World 
Bank, there was strong external involvement and little domestic deliberation. Since 2003, the 
 
35 Kyrgyz official, Interview B, 2019. 
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Kyrgyz Republic has been a respondent in 14 known arbitration cases, and in at least five of 
these cases, the jurisdictional claim was based on the 2003 investment law.36  
Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine IO analytic institutions and the asymmetric diffusion of best practice. 
We focus on including arbitration in domestic law, a policy defined as best practice by the World 
Bank but only recommended to a subset of states. We find that FIAS technical assistance is an 
exceptionally strong predictor of arbitration clauses in domestic investment laws. We are 
relatively confident that there is a causal link between receiving FIAS technical assistance and 
consenting to arbitration in domestic investment laws. Our interviewees alleviated our 
endogeneity concerns and the strong relationship we found between FIAS involvement and 
arbitration clauses in domestic laws is robust to controlling for wider IO or donor community 
involvement and lending. Our placebo tests and the specificity of our findings increases our 
confidence in a causal link. 
We see implications from these findings for scholars and for practitioners. Our interviews 
and findings suggest the drafting of these domestic laws is a strategic context permeated by 
international actors. Future research could probe how other types of international actors, 
including aid agencies, business associations, and foreign law firms, are involved in domestic 
investment law–making processes. In particular, analyzing technical assistance provided by 
national aid agencies, typically under the heading of commercial law reform, may help to explain 
investment laws with arbitration in countries that did not receive FIAS advice. Even in the cases 
we do not explain here, we think it is likely that governments were prompted by external actors 
 
36 Sistem v. Kyrgyzstan (2006); Nadel. v. Kyrgyzstan (2012); Levitis v. Kyrgyzstan (2012); Stans Energy v. 
Kyrgyzstan (II) (2015); and, Consolidated Exploration v. Kyrgyzstan (2013). 
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to provide arbitration consent. Of all the available policies to encourage investment, arbitration 
in domestic law is an odd, little-known choice, unlikely to appeal within governments (as the 
interviewee quoted earlier noted, ‘If we had [deliberated it], all of the Kyrgyz government would 
have been against it’). 
Our findings also have implications for practitioners. Domestic investment laws have not 
featured much in discussions about the backlash against investor-state arbitration, or how it 
might be reformed. Yet, after arbitration cases, several governments have rewritten their 
domestic investment laws to remove access to arbitration, including El Salvador and Egypt, as 
discussed in Appendix A. The increasing salience of investor-state arbitration means that 
recommendations to provide consent in domestic laws may trigger internal and external 
contestation. For instance, after Myanmar received advice from FIAS, drafts of a new law that 
included consent to arbitration were circulated for consultation; at that point, the consent 
provisions were contested, and eventually removed.37 Despite these examples, there is still a 
disconnect: recommending arbitration in domestic investment laws is out of step with current 
government discussions in multilateral fora, which focus on replacing investor-state arbitration 
or undertaking systemic reform. FIAS could revisit its guidance on inserting arbitration into 
domestic laws in light of growing evidence about the costs and benefits of investor-state 
arbitration.  
Our findings also have an implication for arbitrators who interpret these laws. Currently, 
if a domestic investment law is unclear, then ‘arbitral practice, if anything, appears to incline 
toward a liberal interpretation’ (Caron, 2010, p. 673). A liberal interpretation asserts that a 
government intended to give foreign investors consent to arbitration, if there is unclear language. 
 
37 We are grateful to Jonathan Bonnitcha for discussing this with us.  
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Some arbitrators, like Caron, argue that a liberal interpretation is appropriate because of 
assumptions they make about ‘the circumstances of a reasoned, debated, public law’ (Caron, 
2010, p. 674). In this paper, we find that many domestic investment laws are drafted with heavy 
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Appendix A. Coding of Domestic Investment Laws  
In this appendix, we elaborate how we coded our dependent variable, the dispute resolution 
clauses of domestic investment laws. The Appendix has five sections. First, it discusses our 
domestic law sources. Second, it addresses the issue of change over time. Third, it explains how 
we tackled ambiguous language and borderline cases. Fourth, it presents the list of laws that 
mention arbitration. Fifth, it presents the rationale behind the coding for each law coded as 
giving consent to arbitration. 
Sources 
We used two main sources to find the domestic investment laws. Our primary resource is 
UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub’s repository of domestic investment laws.40 The UNCTAD 
repository only includes laws currently in force. We also consulted current and previous versions 
of ICSID’s Investment Laws of the World volumes.41 These volumes have been published since 
1973 and are updated at regular intervals: when a country updates its domestic law, the 
government should report the new law to the ICSID Secretariat, who then updates that country’s 
entry in these volumes.  
Once we had identified what we believed was the first mention or consent to arbitration, 
we then undertook secondary research to confirm our codings, using older IO publications, legal 
scholarship, arbitration awards, and contacting governments. In general we worked backwards 
from the investment law we had identified, trying to find any previous investment laws in that 
country, then checking if the previous laws mentioned or consented to arbitration.  
We also used available tribunal decisions to code if provisions have been found to 
provide consent or not. In order to identify and access tribunal decisions on domestic law cases, 
we used: Investment Treaty Arbitration (ITA) Law,42 PluriCourts Investment Treaty Arbitration 
Database (PITAD),43 and, when awards or other actual case documents were not available, 
 
40 See: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/InvestmentLaws 
41 See: https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/resources/Investment-Laws-of-the-World.aspx) 
42 See: https://www.italaw.com 
43 See: https://pitad.org 
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Investment Arbitration Reporter.44 We did not use UNCTAD since the ‘Investment Disputes 
Settlement Navigator’ only reports treaty-based arbitrations, not domestic law-based arbitrations.   
We believe that we have the most comprehensive panel data yet compiled on the dispute 
resolution provisions of domestic investment laws, but despite our best attempts, it is possible 
that some previous investment laws are not captured here. Constructing uninterrupted records of 
domestic legislation across all non-OECD countries between 1986-2015 and then ascertaining 
how tribunals have interpreted their dispute resolution provisions is a complex, multi-lingual, 
time-intensive task. We have aimed to be frank about the challenges of conducting research in 
this field and to be transparent about what laws we code and what information we used to code 
them. While we acknowledge the possibility of missing laws or differing interpretations, we note 
that for most countries, we were able to construct an uninterrupted record of what laws were in 
force between 1986-2015. Therefore, we do not think the potential missingness meaningfully 
affects our analysis.   
How we addressed change over time 
A main challenge in constructing this indicator was addressing change over time. In this section, 
we discuss how we addressed the four issues related to change over time.  
 
Countries with domestic investment laws with arbitration in force before 1986 
Four countries pass consent prior to 1985 as per our content coding of dispute settlement 
procedures in domestic investment laws: Tunisia (1969), Egypt (1974), Sri Lanka (1978) and 
The Republic of the Congo (1982). These countries are excluded from our population. 
 
Countries that rewrote their laws to remove consent 
Several countries have passed laws that provide access to arbitration after 1986, then passed new 
laws that remove the consent. These countries exit the population on the day they pass the law 
that mentions (or consents) to arbitration. Their subsequent actions do not affect our results. 
 
44 See: https://www.iareporter.com 
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These countries include: El Salvador (consent 1999–2009), Guinea (consent 1987–2015), Jordan 
(consent 1995–2014), Kazahkstan (consent 1994–2003). Egypt and Tunisia also removed 
consent from their laws, but they consented before our time period begins.  
 
Countries that updated their laws and alter the dispute resolution clause 
For countries that pass multiple laws between 1986 and 2015, they exit on the day they pass the 
first law with a mention or with consent (depending on what is being measured).  In some 
instances, countries first pass a law with explicit consent to arbitration, before passing a new law 
that moderates the degree of consent, and in some instances it goes the other way. An example of 
the former is Niger, who passed a law in 2001 that gave clear consent to arbitration, before 
passing a new law in 2014 where the consent is less clear. Niger still exits our sample in 2001. 
An example of the latter is Gambia, who passed a law in 2001 that did not give consent to 
arbitration, before passing a new law in 2010 that gives clear consent. Gambia thus exited our 
sample in 2010. 
 
Countries that passed investment laws after 2015 
Between 31 December 2015, the final day in our analysis, and June 2019, two countries passed 
investment laws that mentioned arbitration: Laos (2016) and Myanmar (2016). We exclude these 
laws from our analysis, even though available evidence suggests they fit our explanation. 
 
Summary of investment laws that we studied, but exclude from our population 
Before: Tunisia (1969), Egypt (1974), Sri Lanka (1978), and the Republic of Congo (1982).  
After: Laos (2016), Myanmar (2016)  
Not World Bank members: Democratic People Republic of Korea (1992), and Kosovo (2005). 
Interestingly, the laws of both DPRK and Kosovo mention arbitration, and Kosovo provides 
clear consent to ICSID.   
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How we addressed ambiguous language and borderline cases 
Coding domestic laws for direct access to arbitration is a detailed, legal task. There are several 
ways in which laws can mention arbitration without providing access to it. Laws that do provide 
access to arbitration do so in many different wordings and formulations. Potestà (2011) identifies 
a spectrum of ways in which laws make reference to ICSID jurisdiction. At one end of Potestà’s 
spectrum are domestic laws that contain a straightforward, standing offer by the state to submit 
disputes to arbitration. This is the case when the piece of legislation uses formulations such as 
“the host state hereby consents” or “the consent of the host state is constituted by this article.”45 
In the middle of the spectrum is legislation which does not provide access to arbitration 
explicitly, but still may be found to give consent to arbitration: this occurred when ICSID 
tribunals examined Georgia’s and El Salvador’s laws and found they contained consent to 
ICSID.46 On the other end of the spectrum are formulations which provide access to arbitration 
“as may be mutually agreed by the parties”, which tribunals have found do not provide access to 
arbitration without consent expressed in another instrument.47  
Since precedent does not operate formally in arbitration, it is up to each tribunal to 
interpret a law’s wording and decide if it has jurisdiction. Tribunal decisions interpreting 
domestic laws have not always been consistent. Therefore, while it is possible to identify patterns 
and general principles, it is impossible to predict, definitively, how laws will be interpreted in the 
future. 
In light of this uncertainty, we employ two codings: laws that mention international 
arbitration and laws that provide consent to arbitration, or more precisely, laws that we believe 
tribunals are likely to interpret as providing direct access to arbitration, based on previous 
tribunal decisions on jurisdiction and published legal interpretations.  
 
45 For instance, the domestic law of Albania, 1993. This provision was at issue in Tradex Hellas v 
Albania.  
46 Zhinvali Development Ltd v. Republic of Georgia, ICSID ARB/00/1, Award, 24 January 2003; Inceysa 
Valliosoletana, SL v Republic of El Salvador, ICSID ARB/03/26, Award, 2 August 2006.  
47 For instance, the tribunal in Biwater Gauff v Tanzania found that the Tanzania’s Investment Act of 
1997 does not provide access to arbitration. It says disputes with foreign investors may be submitted 
to arbitration “as may be mutually agreed by the parties.” Biwater Gauff Ltd v United Republic of 
Tanzania, ICSID ARB/05/22, Award, 24 July 2008, para 329.  
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The first coding, laws that mention arbitration, is straightforward. If international 
arbitration is mentioned in the law, it is coded as “1.” If international arbitration is not 
mentioned, it is coded as “0.” The advantages of this coding are that it is clear and replicable. 
The disadvantage is that this coding likely overreports the number of domestic laws that provide 
access to arbitration. As mentioned above, there are many ways that laws can mention arbitration 
without providing access to it. Some domestic laws refer to arbitration, but specify the parties 
have to agree to the specific arbitration.48 Other domestic laws indicate that bilateral or 
multilateral treaties signed by the state may provide for arbitration, but do not themselves 
provide access to arbitration.49 Future arbitration tribunals, however, may come to different 
conclusions and find that such clauses do provide them with jurisdiction.  
The second coding, laws that we believe would be interpreted by a tribunal as providing 
consent to arbitration, attempts to isolate what really matters: if a domestic law provides foreign 
investors with direct access to arbitration. While more meaningful, this coding is more open to 
challenge, since the phrasing of some clauses is unclear. Our approach is to acknowledge that it 
is impossible to have a definitive count of which clauses provide consent, but take all possible 
steps to ensure that we have an authoritative, well-founded count.  Therefore, we have taken 
several steps to check the validity of this indicator.   
The first check is inter-rater reliability; we were able to compare our coding against the 
coding of an international organization, UNCTAD. (Note: UNCTAD’s coding has no legal force 
and is unlikely to be taken into account by a tribunal.) In 2015, we coded every domestic 
investment law in the ten volumes of the Investment Laws of the World (2014) series, collected 
and published by ICSID. Then, in 2017, UNCTAD released their database of domestic 
investment laws, which had not previously been available. We were then able to compare the 
two codings for the laws in both repositories: there was a high degree of agreement, with 
differences on three laws only, and each difference was one coding “unclear” and the other 
coding “consent.” After this initial comparison, we then undertook more research to fill in laws 
missing from both repositories and searched for tribunal decisions. To generate the “mentions 
arbitration” list, we followed four steps:  
 
48 As examples of this, Potestà 2011 mentions Estonia’s law on Investments of 1991, Indonesia’s law on 
investments of 2007, and Azerbaijan’s law on investments of 1992.  
49 As examples of this, Potestà mentions Algeria’s law of 1993, Uzbekistan’s law of 1998, Ethiopia’s law 
of 1996, Guatemala’s law of 1998, Kazakhstan’s law of 2003.  
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1. We began with 57 clauses listed on the UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub as 
“International Arbitration: Consent” in December 2017.50  
2. Then we added laws that appear in the ICSID Foreign Investment Laws of the World but 
are not included in the UNCTAD data, and mention international arbitration. 
3. Then we added laws that were discussed in cases, but did not appear in either repository.  
4. Then we searched for earlier laws that mentioned arbitration.  
 
Then, once had the list below of 74 laws that mention arbitration, we coded those 74 to see 
which provided consent and which did not. Here is the procedure we followed:  
1. If a tribunal has found that a law provides jurisdiction, then we code it ‘Consent.’ If a 
tribunal has found that a law does not provide jurisdiction, then we code it as ‘No 
consent.’ We follow tribunal decisions, even if according to our coding rules below it 
would have been coded differently.  
2. If no tribunal has interpreted a provision, we then relied heavily on legal scholarship, in 
particular Michele Potestà’s article on consent in domestic investment laws.  
3. If a tribunal had not interpreted a provision and it was not discussed in legal scholarship, 
then we kept our rules for interpretation constant:  
a. When a clause specifies that the investor and state “must agree” to submit the 
dispute to arbitration, we code this as not providing consent. Examples of this are: 
Estonia’s Investment Law of 1991, Indonesia’s Investment Law of 2007, and 
Azerbaijan’s Investment Law of 1992.  
b. When a clause specifies that arbitration must be agreed in the original contract, or 
that a country has signed bilateral or multilateral treaties that may provide for 
arbitration (but do not themselves provide access to arbitration), we code this as 
 
50 See: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/InvestmentLaws/B#il-top. 
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not providing consent. Examples of this are: Algeria’s Investment Law of 1993, 
Uzbekistan’s Investment Law of 1998, Ethiopia’s Law of 1996, Guatemala’s 
Investment Law of 1998, and Kazakhstan’s Investment Law of 2003.  
4. There are six laws listed in the table as unclear followed by what we think a tribunal is 
likely to decide. Our reasoning for each is summarized here:   
a. Belarus. Unclear, would likely be interpreted as providing consent: ‘If disputes 
not referred to the exclusive competence of courts of the Republic of Belarus, 
arisen between an investor and the Republic of Belarus are not regulated under a 
pre-trial procedure through negotiations … then such disputes may, at the option 
of the investor, be regulated also: in an arbitration court [ICSID or UNCITRAL].’ 
b. Lithuania. Unclear, would likely be interpreted as providing consent. Article 6 (2) 
suggests the parties need to agree on the venue, but Article 6.3 gives 
unambiguous access.  ‘In the case of investment disputes the foreign 
investor/investors shall have the right to apply directly to the ICSID.’ 
c. Mauritania. Unclear, would likely be interpreted as providing consent Dispute 
procedure is the choice of the parties (“au choix des parties”), but the three 
options listed as choices are all international arbitration. 
d. Nicaragua. Unclear, likely to be interpreted as providing consent. Any dispute 
may or can be submitted to international arbitration in accordance with what is 
established by regulation (“podrá someterse a Arbitraje Internacional de acuerdo 
con lo que se disponga reglamentariamente”).  
e. Russian Federation. Unclear, likely to be interpreted as no consent. Expert 
opinion as well as Russian Supreme Court decision suggesting no consent. The 
relevant language is: disputes ‘shall be resolved in compliance with international 
treaties of the Russian Federation and federal laws in the court or arbitration court 
or in an international arbitration court.’ 
f. Syrian Arab Republic. Ambiguous, but may be interpreted by a tribunal as 
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providing consent. The provision is not specific and does not mention any 
international instruments, but does say that if the disputing parties cannot reach an 





Laws that mention international arbitration 
Country Law Name Year passed 
Afghanistan Law on Domestic and Foreign Private Investment 2005 
Albania Law on Foreign Investments of November 1993 1993 
Algeria Algérie Promotion de l’investissement 1993 
Azerbaijan Law on the Protection of Foreign Investments 1992 
Belarus Law of the Republic of Belarus on Investments 2013 
Benin Law 90-002 of May 9, 1990 relating to the Code 
of Investments 
1990 
Bolivia Ley de Inversiones 1990 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Law on the Policy of Foreign Direct Investment 1998 
Burkina Faso Code des Investissements 1995 
Burundi Investment Code 2008 
Cabo Verde External Investment Code 1993 
Cambodia Law on Investment 1994 
Cameroon Investment Charter 1990 
Central African Republic Charte Communautaire de l’Investissement 2001 
Chad Charte des Investissements 2008 
China Law on Sino-foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures 1988 
Colombia Decreto 2080 de 2000 y sus Modificaciones 2000 
Côte d'Ivoire Code des Investissements 1995 
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 
Code des Investissements 2002 
Ecuador Ley de Promoción y Garantía de Inversiones 1997 
El Salvador Investment Law (Decree No. 732) 1999 
Fiji Foreign Investment Act of Fiji  (Amendments)  2004 
Gambia Investment and Export Promotion Agency Act 2010 
Georgia Law on the Investment Activity Promotion and 
Guarantees 
1996 
Ghana Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act 1994 
Guinea Code Des Investissements 1987 
Guyana Investment Act 2004 2004 
Honduras Decreto No 51-2011 Ley para la Promocion y 
Proteccion de Inversiones 
2011 
Indonesia Law Concerning Investment 2007 
Iran Law on Encouragement and Protection of Foreign 
Investment 
2002 
Iraq Investment Law 2006 
Jordan The Investment Promotion Law of 1995 1995 
Kazakhstan Law on Investments 1994 
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Kuwait Law Regarding the Promotion of Direct 
Investment 
2013 
Kyrgyz Republic Law on Investments 2003 
Liberia Investment Act of 2010 2010 
Libya Law on Investment Promotion 2010 
Lithuania Law on Investment 1999 
Madagascar Investment Law 2008 
Malawi Investment Promotion Act 1992 
Mali Law No. 91-048/AN-RM of 26 February 1991 
Bearing on Investment Law 
1991 
Mauritania Code des Investissements 2002 
Moldova Law on Investments in Entrepreneurial Activity 2004 
Mongolia Law on Investment 2013 
Montenegro Foreign Investment Law 2011 
Mozambique Law on Investment 1993 
Namibia Foreign Investment Act 1990 
Nepal Foreign Investment and Technology Transfer Act 
1992 
1992 
Nicaragua Ley de Promoción de Inversiones Extranjeras 2000 
Niger Code des investissements en Republique du Niger 1989 
Nigeria Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act 1995 
Oman Foreign Capital Investment Law 1994 
Papua New Guinea Investment Promotion Act 1992 1992 
Paraguay Ley de Inversiones 1992 
Qatar Law on Organization of Foreign Capital in the 
Economic Activity 
2000 
Russian Federation Law on Foreign Investments 1999 
Rwanda Law Relating to Investment Promotion And 
Facilitation 
2015 
Sierra Leone The Investment Promotion Act, 2004 2004 
Solomon Islands Foreign Investment Act 2005 2005 
Somalia The Foreign Investment Law 1987 
South Sudan The Investment Promotion Act, 2009 2009 
Sudan National Investment Encouragement Act 2013 2013 
Syrian Arab Republic Investment Promotion Law 2007 
Tajikistan The Law of the Republic of Tajikistan on 
Investments 
2007 
Tanzania Tanzania Investment Act, 1997 1997 
Timor-Leste Foreign Investment Law 2005 
Togo Code Des Investissements 1989 
Tonga Foreign Investment Act 2002 2002 
Turkey Foreign Direct Investment Law 2003 
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Uganda Investment Code Act 1991 
Uzbekistan Law on Guarantees and Measures of Protection of 
Foreign Investors' Rights 
1998 
Venezuela Ley de Promoción y Protección de Inversiones 1999 
Yemen Investment Law 2010 





Laws that consent to international arbitration 
Country Law Name Year 
passed 
Source Coding  
 
Afghanistan Law on Domestic and Foreign Private 
Investment 
2005 UNCTAD Consent 
Note: UNCTAD and ICSID 2012-1 both have 2005 Afghanistan Private Investment Laws, but the two 
are different. Both are unofficial translations (although the ICSID version is a translation provided by 
the Embassy of Afghanistan in Washington DC.) The dispute resolution clauses are below – both 
provide consent. 
UNCTAD version  
Article 26. Disputes between foreign and domestic investors versus the Office of Investment and 
government officials may be directly resolved in an amicable manner by understanding and observing 
the rules of this legislation and documentation of the Enterprise, including whatever specialized 
contracts have been signed and agreed upon.                         
Should the disputes not be resolved in this manner, the parties shall settle their dispute according to the 
provisions of the Washington Arbitration Regulations of March 18, 1965 or in accordance with the 
United Nation’s Judiciary Laws for International Commerce.  
Article 27. The decision based on theses international agreements for dispute settlement and/or their 
rendered judgments shall be final and both parties are obliged to accept such a final decision. 
ICSID 2012-1 Version  
Article 30, (5). If a dispute arises pursuant to a contract or other agreement between a Foreign Investor 
or an Approved Enterprise with foreign ownership on one hand and an administration or organization of 
the State on the other hand with regard to a Foreign Investment (...) the parties shall endeavor to settle 
such dispute amicably by mutual discussions. Failing such amicable settlement, and unless the parties to 
such dispute otherwise agree, the parties shall submit such dispute to: The International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) for settlement, pursuant to the Convention on the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States of March 18, 1965. 2. Arbitration 
in Accordance with UNCTIRAL Rules if ICSID rules preclude [the Foreign Investors from] arbitrating 
before ICSID. The Government, in such cases, consents to the submission of any such dispute to ICSID 
for settlement by arbitration in accordance with Article 25 (1) of the Convention.  
Albania Law on Foreign Investments of 
November 1993 
1993 ICSID Consent  
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Tradex Hellas v Albania found that Albania had "unambiguously" consented to the jurisdiction of the 
Centre by way of that legislative provision (171-178). 
Article 8. Settling of Disputes. If a disagreement with respect to a foreign investment between a foreign 
investor and the state administration of the Republic of Albania, which is not settled by agreement, then 
the foreign investor may apply to a court or arbitration tribunal competent in the Republic of Albania, in 
accordance with its compensation for expropriation or discrimination, or with transfers under Article 7 
of this law, then the foreign investor may also apply to the International Center for the Resolution of 
Investment Disputes (the Center) established by the Convention for the resolution of investment disputes 
between states and citizens of other states approved in Washington on  March 18, 1965. 
Algeria Algérie Promotion de l’investissement 1993 Potestà No consent 
Potestà argues "Article 43 of Law No. 93-12 reminds of the fact of BITs or multilateral treaties which 
may provide for arbitration."  
ICSID (2009-2 version) replaced this law with several ordinances related to investment from 2001-8. 
None provided consent. 
Azerbaijan Law on the Protection of Foreign 
Investments 
1992 UNCTAD No consent 
Note: ICSID (2004-1) has a different title for the law and lists it as 1995, but the clause wording is the 
same. Potestà confirms that this clause means a dispute can only be submitted if both the state and 
investor choose to do so. Baker and McKenzie “Doing Business in Azerbaijan” also finds no consent 
(page 165 here: https://www.bakermckenzie.com/-
/media/files/insight/publications/2018/04/bkdbgazerbaijanapr18.pdf?la=en):  “Foreign investors may 
rely on the provisions of the CCP and the law On Protection of Foreign Investments dated 15 January 
1992 (the ‘Foreign Investment Law’) pursuant to which investment disputes may be resolved either by 
Azerbaijani courts or in accordance with the dispute resolution procedures agreed by the parties. This 
may include international arbitration, either in Azerbaijan or abroad.” 
Article 42. Settlement of disputes. Disputes or disagreements arising between foreign investors and 
enterprises with foreign investments and state bodies of the Azerbaijan Republic, enterprises, public 
organizations and other legal entities of the Azerbaijan Republic, disputes and disagreements between 
participants of the enterprise with foreign investments and such enterprise itself are to be settled in Law 
Courts of the Azerbaijan Republic or, on agreement between the Parties, in the Court of Arbitration, 
including those abroad. 
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Belarus Law of the Republic of Belarus on 
Investments 
2013 UNCTAD Unclear, 






Note: ICSID (2004-1) has a 2001 investment code that does not provide consent. 
Article 13. Settlement of disputes between an investor and the Republic of Belarus 
Disputes between an investor and the Republic of Belarus arising in the carrying out of investments are 
settled under a pre-trial procedure through negotiations, unless otherwise established by the legislative 
acts of the Republic of Belarus. 
Disputes between an investor and the Republic of Belarus not regulated under a pre-trial procedure 
through negotiations within three months from the day of receipt of a written proposal about the 
regulation thereof are settled through court proceedings in accordance with the legislation of the 
Republic of Belarus. 
If disputes not referred to the exclusive competence of courts of the Republic of Belarus, arisen between 
an investor and the Republic of Belarus are not regulated under a pre-trial procedure through 
negotiations within three months from the day of receipt of a written proposal about the regulation 
thereof under a pre-trial procedure, then such disputes may, at the option of the investor, be regulated 
also: 
• in an arbitration court being established for settlement of each specific disputed according to the 
Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), unless 
the parties agree otherwise; at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in 
the case if this foreign investor is citizen or legal person of a member state of the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States of March 18, 1965. 
In the case if a treaty of the Republic of Belarus and/or a contract concluded between an investor and the 
Republic of Belarus establishes otherwise in relation to the settlement of disputes between the investor 
and the Republic of Belarus arising in the carrying out of investments, then provisions of this treaty of 
the Republic of Belarus and/or the contract concluded between the investor and the Republic of Belarus 




Benin Law 90-002 of May 9, 1990 relating to 
the Code of Investments 
1990 ICSID Consent 
Title V, Article 74. Note: the copy provided to ICSID is a strange translation, but clearly provides ad hoc 
arbitration or ‘the right to apply to ICSID.’ 
Bolivia Law on the Policy of Foreign Direct 
Investment (Ley No. 1182) 
1990 ICSID No consent 
Our interpretation is based on the phrase ‘in conformity with the constitution’ (‘de conformidad a la 
Constitución Política del Estado’) which we believe would likely lead a tribunal to decline jurisdiction.  
Article 10. Los inversionistas nacionales y extranjeros podrán acordar someter sus diferencias a 
tribunales arbitrales, de conformidad a la Constitución Política del Estado y normas internacionales. 
Article  11. Los inversionistas nacionales y extranjeros podrán acogerse a los incentivos otorgados por el 
Gobierno Nacional.  
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Law on the Policy of Foreign Direct 
Investment 
1998 UNCTAD No consent 
Article 17     Foreign investment disputes shall be settled by the relevant courts in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, unless interested parties contract some other procedure for the settlement of disputes, 
including but not limited to domestic or international conciliation or arbitration. 
Burkina Faso Code des Investissements 1995 UNCTAD Consent  
Chapitre III. Règlement des différends 
Article 30 
Le règlement des différends résultant de l’application des dispositions du présent Code aux entreprises 
agréées et la détermination de l’indemnité due par méconnaissance ou violation des obligations 
imposées, des engagements souscrits ou des garanties octroyés peut, indépendamment des voies de 
recours devant la juridiction administrative du Burkina Faso faire l’objet d’une procédure d’arbitrage. 
Il est prévu deux procédures d’arbitrage: 
1. La constitution d’un collège arbitral par: 
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• désignation d’un arbitre par chacune des parties; 
• désignation d’un tiers arbitre par les deux premiers arbitres. 
La désignation du second ou du tiers arbitre sera faite à l’initiative de la partie la plus diligente par la 
Cour Suprême du Burkina Faso dans l’un des cas suivants: 
• l’une des deux parties n’aurait pas désigné son arbitre dans les 60 jours suivant la notification par l’autre 
partie de son arbitre désigné; 
• les deux arbitres ne se seraient pas mis d’accord dans les 30 jours suivant la désignation du second 
arbitre sur le choix du tiers arbitre. 
Les arbitres établiront leur procédure, ils statueront ex æquo et bobo, la sanction arbitrale sera 
définitivement exécutoire sans procédure d’exequatur. 
2. Le recours au Centre International pour le règlement des Différends Relatifs aux Investissements 
(CIRDI). 
Lorsque les intérêts étrangers sont en cause, il existe en outre deux voies de recours: recours au CIRDI 
(Centre International pour le règlement des Différends Relatifs aux Investissements) créé par la Banque 
Internationale pour la Reconstruction et le Développement par la Convention de 1965 ou recours à la 
Cour Permanente d’Arbitrage de la Hayes. 
La demande d’arbitrage, à l’initiative de l’une des deux parties suspend automatiquement toute 
procédure contentieuse qui aurait été engagée auparavant. 
Burundi Investment Code 2008 UNCTAD Consent  
Title IV.    Settlement of disputes  
Article 17     Disputes resulting from the application of the present investment code between the 
Government and the investor, which are not settled amicably, shall be settled in accordance with the 
laws and regulations in force in Burundi. Disputes can be settled, according to the choice of the investor, 
by internal institutional arbitration or international arbitration. 
 
When the investor takes recourse to international arbitration, he will do so in accordance with arbitration 
rules of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes as applicable at the time of 
execution of the investment which gave rise to the dispute. 
Cabo Verde External Investment Code 1993 UNCTAD Consent 
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Note: the law does not refer to the New York or ICSID Conventions for enforcement and says the 
arbitration will take place in Cabo Verde. 
Article 17.  Conciliation and Arbitration 
Conflicts between the State and the foreign investor regarding foreign investments, will be solved by 
means of conciliation and arbitration, according to the present article, if other methods have not been 
established differently in international agreements signed by the Government of Cabo Verde or defined 
by common agreement by the parties. 
The arbitration procedure is initiated by written notice from one party to the other, stating: 
The notified party must respond in writing, within 30 days, referring expressly to all points listed in 
number 2 above.The arbitration will be performed by a single arbitrator, except when the parties agree 
upon the use of an arbitrage commission to be established non later than 45 days from the date of the 
written notice established in number 2.The single arbitrator will be appointed by joint agreement of both 
parties. They may choose to request his/her appointment by the Superior Court or, if the foreign investor 
is not Capeverdean, by an international arbitration entity agreed upon. 
If, within 90 days of the written notice referred to in the previous number 2, there is no agreement on the 
process of nomination of a single arbitrator, any of the parties may request his/her nomination by the 
Paris headquarters of the International Chamber of Commerce. When the investor is a Capeverdean, the 
request is submitted to the Superior Court.The single arbitrator or the president of the commission 
designated by the Paris International Chamber of Commerce, as established previously, can not be of the 
same nationality of none of the involved parties. 
The following applies to the resolution of conflicts: The arbitration will take place in Cabo Verde, if 
another location is not agreed upon by the parties. The arbitration language will be Portuguese, if the 
parties do not disagree on the matter. The decision of the arbitration is final and not subject to appeal. 
Cambodia Law on Investment 1994 UNCTAD No consent  
Note: arbitration in or outside Cambodia “as agreed by both parties.”  
Article 20 
Except for land-related disputes, any dispute relating to a QIP concerning its right and obligations set 
forth in the law shall be settled amicably as far as possible through consultation between the Council for 
the Development of Cambodia, the investors and any other party involved in the dispute. 
If the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement within two months from the date of the first written 
request to enter such consultations, the dispute shall be brought by either party for: 
Conciliation before the Council which shall provide its opinion, or Arbitration in or outside of Cambodia 
as agreed by both parties, or Trial by the tribunals of the Kingdom of Cambodia.  
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Cameroon Ordinance Law No. 90/7 of 8 Nov., 
1990  
1990 Article Consent 
The 1990 Code provided access to arbitration at the ICC or at ICSID, in article 45, according to: Kofele-
Kale, Ndiva. (1991). ‘Investment Codes as Instruments of Economic Policy: A Cameroon Case Study.’ 
The International Lawyer 25 (4): 821-858.  
‘Article 45 reserves, to the foreign investor operating in Cameroon, the right to have any disputes 
pertaining to the validity and interpretation of the investment agreement resolved through arbitration or 
conciliation under the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) or the International Centre 
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)’ (Kofele-Kale, 1991: 837).  
It is no publicly known if this 1990 law or the later 2002 law was used as the basis for the claim in 




Charte Communautaire de 
l’Investissement 
2001 UNCTAD No consent 
 
Note: Article 23 says the recourse to ICSID jurisdiction or the Additional Facility must be expressively 
set out in the license/approval (that the foreign investor got when initiating the investment).  
Art 22. Tout différent opposant un ou plusieurs investisseurs à l'Etat centrafricain concernant 
l'application de la charte est réglé conformément à une procédure d'arbitrage et de conciliation 
découlant: (…) oit de la Convention du 10 mars 1965 pour le règlement des différends relatifs aux 
investissements entre l'Etat et les ressortissants d'autres Etats, établie sous l'égide de la Banque 
Interntionale pour la Reconstruction et le Développement (BIRD) et ratifiée par la République 
Centrafricaine le 23 février 1966; soit, si la personne physique ou morale concernée ne remplit pas les 
conditions de nationalité stipulées à l'article 25 de la Convention susvisée, conformément aux 
dispositions des règlements du mécanisme supplémentaire approuvées par le Conseil d'Administration 
du CIRDI. Article 23. Le recours aux juridictions du CIRDI ou au mécanisme supplémentaire tels 
qu'énoncés ci-dessus doit être expressément précisé dans les agréements. 
Article 23 
Le recours aux juridictions du CIRDI ou au mécanisme supplémentaire tels qu’énoncés ci-dessus doit 
être expressément précisé dans les agréments. 
Chad Charte des Investissements 2008 UNCTAD No consent 
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Article 8.  
L’Etat veille à la promotion de la sécurité juridique et judiciaire et au renforcement de l’Etat de droit à 
travers les dispositions suivantes: 
• créer les conditions juridiques de base nécessaires pour attirer les investissements privés et renforcer les 
droits des investisseurs; 
• adhérer aux dispositions internationales de garantie et de protection des investissements et respecter les 
accords bilatéraux et multilatéraux y relatifs notamment ceux de l’Agence Multilatérale de Garantie des 
Investissements (AMGI), du Centre International pour le Règlement des Différends relatifs aux 
Investissements (CIRDI); garantir l’application des procédures et arrêts de la Cour Communautaire de 
Justice de la CEMAC et de la Cour Commune de Justice et d’Arbitrage (CCJA) de l’Organisation pour 
l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires (OHADA); renforcer les capacités des magistrats dans 
le traitement des affaires commerciales; veiller à l’exécution diligente des décisions de justice et 
d’arbitrage. 
China Law on Sino-foreign Cooperative Joint 
Ventures 
1988 ICSID No consent 
Note: UNCTAD has two laws, including the Law on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises (1986) that 
does not mention arbitration or dispute settlement. In this law, arbitration is mentioned, but must be 
included in the initial contract or agreed separately.  
Article 25   If a dispute arises between Chinese and foreign partners over the implementation of a co-
operative enterprise contract, the matter shall be resolved through consultation or mediation. If the 
Chinese and foreign partners are unwilling to use consultation or mediation to resolve the dispute or if 
consultation or mediation fail to produce a result, the matter may be submitted to a Chinese arbitral body 
or another arbitral body for arbitration in accordance with the provisions on arbitration in the co-
operative enterprise contract or an arbitral agreement concluded in writing after the dispute has arisen. 
If the Chinese and foreign partners have not included provisions on arbitration in the co-operative 
enterprise contract and fail to conclude a written arbitral agreement after a dispute has arisen, a suit may 
be filed in a Chinese court. 
Colombia Decreto 2080 de 2000 y sus 
Modificaciones 
2000 UNCTAD No consent  
Note: disputes will be resolved in Colombian courts “except as provided for in international treaties.” 
Artículo 14. Ley y jurisdicción aplicables 
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Salvo lo dispuesto en los tratados o convenios internacionales vigentes, en la solución de controversias o 
conflictos derivados de la aplicación del régimen de las inversiones de capital del exterior, se aplicará lo 
dispuesto en la legislación colombiana. 
Con la misma salvedad contemplada en el inciso anterior y sin perjuicio de las acciones que puedan 
instaurarse ante jurisdicciones extranjeras, todo lo atinente a las inversiones de capital del exterior, 
también estará sometido a la jurisdicción de los tribunales y normas arbitrales colombianas, salvo que 
las partes hayan pactado el arbitraje internacional. 
Côte d'Ivoire Code des Investissements 1995 ICSID Consent 
 
Potestà calls this unambiguous consent (the 1995 and 2012 versions of the law are identical).  The last 
line says that “the consent of the parties to the jurisdiction of ICSID or the additional mechanism, as the 
case may be, required by the instruments governing them, is hereby established for the Republic of Côte 
d'Ivoire, and is expressed expressly in the application for approval for the person concerned.” 
2012 Law at UNCTAD:  
Article 20 
L’Etat garantit aux investisseurs, le droit à un procès équitable pour tout litige né dans le cadre de 
l’application des dispositions du présent Code. 
Tout différend ou litige entre les personnes physiques ou morales étrangères et la République de Côte 
d’Ivoire, relatif à l’application du présent Code, à défaut d’un règlement amiable, est réglé par les 
juridictions ivoiriennes ou par un tribunal arbitral. Les compétences du tribunal arbitral sont déterminées 
dans les conditions ci-après: 
• des Accords et Traités relatifs à la protection des investissements sont conclus entre la République de 
Côte d’Ivoire et l’Etat dont la personne physique ou morale étrangère concernée est ressortissante; 
• une procédure de conciliation et d’arbitrage dont les parties sont convenues est définie; 
• la Convention du 18 mars 1965 pour le règlement des différends relatifs aux investissements entre Etats 
et ressortissants d’autres Etats, établie sous l’égide de la Banque Internationale pour la Reconstruction et 
le Développement et ratifiée par la République de Côte d’Ivoire en vertu du décret n° 65-238 du 26 juin 
1965, est applicable; 
• la personne concernée ne remplit pas les conditions de nationalité stipulée à l’article 25 de la convention 
susvisée, conformément aux dispositions des règlements du mécanisme supplémentaire, approuvé par le 
Conseil d’Administration du Centre International pour le Règlement des Différends relatifs aux 
Investissements, en abrégé CIRDI. Le consentement des parties à la compétence du CIRDI ou du 
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mécanisme supplémentaire, selon le cas, requis par les instruments les régissant, est constitué pour la 
République de Côte d’Ivoire par le présent article, et est exprimé expressément dans la demande 








This law was the basis of jurisdiction for Abou Lahoud and Bounafeh-Abou Lahoud v Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No ARB/10/4, as well as International Quantum Resources Limited, 
Frontier SPRL et Compagnie Minière de Sakania SPRL v. République démocratique du Congo, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/10/21. Potestà also says this clause has unambiguous consent. 
Tire IX. Du règlement des litiges 
Article 37 
Les litiges pouvant survenir à l'occasion de l'interprétation ou de l'application des dispositions de la 
présente loi ou de l'Arrêté Interministériel prévu au Titre III de la présente loi peuvent faire l'objet d'un 
arbitrage, selon la procédure prévue aux articles 159 à 174 du Code de Procédure Civile Congolais. 
Article 38  
Tout différend entre un investisseur et la République Démocratique du Congo relatif à: 
• un contrat ou accord d'investissement; 
• une autorisation d'investissement octroyée par l'autorité compétente, ou; 
• toute violation des droits de l'investisseur et / ou de l'investissement attribués ou crées par le Code des 
investissements ou par d'autres lois nationales ou par les Traités et Conventions Internationaux auxquels 
la République Démocratique du Congo a adhéré est réglé dans la mesure du possible, à l'amiable par 
voie de négociations.  
Si les parties ne parviennent pas à un règlement à l'amiable de leur différend dans un délai de 3 mois à 
compter de la première notification écrite demandant l'engagement de telles négociations, le différend 
sera réglé, à la requête de la partie lésée, conformément à une procédure d'arbitrage découlant: 
• ode la Convention du 18 mars 1965 pour le règlement des différends relatifs aux investissements entre 
Etats et Ressortissants d'autres Etats, (Convention CIRDI), ratifiée par la République Démocratique du 
Congo le 29 avril 1970 ou 
• des dispositions des Règlements du Mécanisme supplémentaire, si l'investisseur ne remplit pas les 
conditions de nationalité stipulées à l'article 25 de la Convention CIRDI; 
• du Règlement d'arbitrage de la Chambre de Commerce Internationale de Paris. Le consentement des 
parties à la compétence du CIRDI ou du Mécanisme Supplémentaire, selon le cas, requis par les 
instruments les régissant, est constitué en ce qui concerne la République Démocratique du Congo par le 
présent article et en ce qui concerne l'investisseur par sa demande d'admission au régime de la présente 
loi ou ultérieurement par acte séparé. 
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Si l'investisseur a effectué son investissement par l'intermédiaire d'une société de droit congolais qu'il 
contrôle, les parties conviennent qu'une telle société, aux fins de la Convention CIRDI, doit être 
considérée comme un ressortissant d'un autre Etat contractant. 
Ecuador  Ley de Promoción y Garantía de 
Inversiones 
1997 UNCTAD No consent 
Article 31. El Ecuador respeta plenamente los Tratados y Convenios que en materia de Promoción y 
Protección de Inversiones, incluyendo los referidos a evitar la doble tributación, ha firmado y ratificado 
con otros países o en el marco de su participación en organismos internacionales. 
Article 32. El Estado y los inversionistas extranjeros podrán someter las controversias que se suscitaren 
por la aplicación de esta Ley a Tribunales Arbitrales constituidos en virtud de Tratados Internacionales 
de los cuales sea parte el Ecuador o a los procedimientos específicamente acordados o estipulados en los 
convenios bilaterales o multilaterales firmados y ratificados por el País. 
El Salvador Investment Law (Decree No. 732) 1999 Cases Consent 
Article 15 of El Salvador’s investment law was the basis for jurisdiction in Pacific Rim v El Salvador. 
The tribunal in Inceysa v. El Salvador noted that the law provided consent: “The foregoing clearly 
indicates that the Salvadoran State, by Article 15 of the Investment Law, made to the foreign investors a 
unilateral offer of consent to submit, if the foreign investor so decides, to the jurisdiction of the Centre, 
to hear all ́disputes referring to investments ́ arising between El Salvador and the investor in question. 
However, in the case at hand, as indicated in the previous paragraphs, Inceysa cannot enjoy the rights 
granted by said Investment Law because its ́investment ́ does not meet the conditions of legality.”  
Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. The Republic of El Salvador, Memorial Objections on Jurisdiction (page 114). 
Article 15:  
Should disputes or differences arise among local or foreign investors and the State, regarding the 
investments made by them in El Salvador, the parties may resort to the competent courts of justice, in 
accordance with legal proceedings.  
In case of disputes arising between foreign investors and the State, regarding their investments in El 
Salvador, the investors may refer the dispute to:  
a) The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), in order to settle the dispute 
by means of conciliation and arbitration, in accordance with the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States (ICSID Convention) . . . .  
Fiji Foreign Investment Act of Fiji (2004 
Amendments) 
2004 ICSID No consent 
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Section 14 (3) A foreign investor has the same right as a national enterprise to recourse to the 
jurisdiction of courts or other tribunals of the Fiji Islands in respect of settlement of disputes. 
(4) The court or tribunal may take into account the principles of the International Convention on 
Settlement of Investment Disputes when settling any disputes involving a foreign investor. 
 
Gambia Investment and Export Promotion 
Agency Act 
2010 UNCTAD Consent 
 
Note: ICSID (2008-1) has earlier law (from 2001), with a different clause that does not constitute 
consent. 
Article 55. Dispute resolution 
1) Where a dispute arises between investors or between an investor and the Government, the parties to 
the dispute shall settle their difference amicably through conciliation or mediation. 
2) Where the parties fail to resolve the matter through conciliation or mediation they may resort to: 
a. arbitration under the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of The Gambia; 
b. the international Centre for the Settlements of Investment Disputes; or 
c. the provisions of any existing Bilateral Investment Treaty between The Gambia and the country the 
investor originates from. 
Georgia Law on the Investment Activity 
Promotion and Guarantees 
1996 UNCTAD Consent 
 
This law was the basis for Zhinvali Development Ltd v Republic of Georgia, in which the tribunal found 
it embodied state consent to ICSID. 
Article 16. Procedure for dispute resolution 
1) A dispute between a foreign investor and an enterprise registered in Georgia shall be subject to 
resolution under the agreement of the parties or in courts of Georgia. 
2) A dispute between a foreign investor and a state agency shall unless the procedure for its resolution is 
not defined by way of their agreement, be subject to resolution in courts of Georgia or in the 
International Center for the Resolution Investment Disputes. Unless the dispute is considered in the 
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International Center for the Resolution of Investment Disputes, a foreign investor shall be entitled to 
apply to any international arbitration body which has been set up by the Commission of the United 
Nations for International Trade Law - UNCITRAL to resolve the dispute in accordance with the rules 
established under the arbitration and international agreement. 
3) Any award of the international arbitration bodies as indicated in paragraph 2 of this Article shall be 
final and not subject to appeal. Its observance shall be secured by the state. 
Ghana Ghana Investment Promotion Centre 
Act 
1994 ICSID Consent  
 
Article 29 (2) Any dispute between an investor and Government in respect of an enterprise to which this 
Act applies which is not amicably settled through mutual discussions may be submitted at the option of 
the aggrieved party to arbitration as follows----(a) in accordance with the rules of procedure for 
arbitration of UNCITRAL or (b) in the case of a foreign investor, within the framework of any bilateral 
or multilateral agreement on investment protection to which the Government and the country of which 
the investor is a national are parties (c) in accordance with any other national or international machinery 
for the settlement of investment dispute agreement to by the parties. (3) Where in respect of any dispute, 
there is disagreement between the investor and the Government as to the method of dispute settlement to 
be adopted, the choice of the investor shall prevail. 
Guinea Code Des Investissements 1987 ICSID (1987-4) Consent 
Guinea’s law was the basis for several claims:  
• Getma International and others v. Republic of Guinea [II], ICSID Case No. ARB/11/29 
• Société Civile Immobilière de Gaëta v. Republic of Guinea, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/36 
• BSG Resources Limited, BSG Resources (Guinea) Limited and BSG Resources (Guinea) SÀRL v. 
Republic of Guinea, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/22 
The 1987 law was replaced in 2015 with a law that did not consent to arbitration. The text of the 1987 
law is available here: https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/laws/ITA%20LAW%207039.pdf  
Art.28.- 1) Les différends résultant de l’interpré tation ou de l’application du présent code, sont ré glés 
par les juridictions guinéennes compétentes conformément aux lois et règlements de la Répu blique.  
2) Toutefois, les différends entre l’Etat Guinéen et les ressortissants étrangers, relatifs à l’application ou 
l’interprétation du présent code, sont, sauf ac cord contraire des parties en cause, définitivement réglés 
par arbitrage conduit :  
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• conformément aux dispositions de la conven tion du 18 mars 1985 pour le « Règlement des différends 
relatifs aux investissements entre Etats et ressortissants d’autres Etats » établie sous l’égide de la Banque 
Internationale pour la Reconstitution et le Développement, ratifiée par la République de Guinée le 4 
novembre 1986, ou  
• si la personne ou l’entreprise concernée ne remplit pas les conditions de nationalité stipu lée à l’article 
25 de ladite convention, confor mément aux dispositions des règlements du mécanisme supplémentaire 
approuvé le 27 sep tembre 1978, par le Conseil Administratif du Centre International pour le Règlement 
des Différends Relatifs aux Investissements (CIRDI).  
Guyana Investment Act 2004 2004 UNCTAD Consent 
Section 28. Dispute resolution 
1) In the event of disputes among foreign investors within an investment enterprise, or among foreign 
investors and domestic investors, or among Guyanese investors, or between the investors and the 
Government with respect to an investment enterprise, the parties to the dispute shall first seek to settle 
their disputes through consultation or meditation in order to reach an amicable settlement. 
2) If parties to the dispute fail to resolve the matter, they may; 
a. submit their dispute to arbitration under the Arbitration Act; 
b. invoke the jurisdiction of the competent courts in Guyana; 
c. adopt such other procedure provided for in the articles of association or other constituent document of 
the investment enterprise; or 
d. submit their dispute to the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSlD) of 
which Guyana is a member. 
Honduras Decreto No 51-2011 Ley para la 
Promocion y Proteccion de Inversiones 
2011 ICSID (2012-2) Consent  
Articulo 25. Cuando no se logre un acuerdo a través de los medios de negociación y conciliación, los 
inversionistas extranjeros cuya nacionalidad corresponda a un Estado que hubiere suscrito y ratificado el 
CIADI o que se hubiere adherido al mismo con posterioridad, podrán recurrir a uno de los siguientes 
mecanismos de solución de conflictos: (1) Arbitraje Internacional ante el CIADI de conformidad consu 
Convenio Constitutivo y sus reglas internas; (2) Arbitraje nacional o internacional ante uno de los 
Centros de Conciliación y Arbitraje Nacional; y, (3) La Justicia Ordinaria. Articulo 26. En cuanto a los 
inversionistas de países que no son parte del Convenio Constitutivo del CIADI, en aquellos casos en que 
no se hubiese logrado un acuerdo a través de los medios de negociación y conciliación, podrán recurrir a 
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uno de los siguientes mecanismos de solución de conflictos: (1) Arbitraje Internacional haciendo uso del 
mecanismo complementario del CIADI; 2 and 3 as above. 
Indonesia Law Concerning Investment 2007 UNCTAD No consent  
Note: Potestà says that parties have to agree.  
Chapter XV. Dispute settlement  
Article 32 
1) In the event of dispute in investment sector between Government and any investors, the two parties 
shall devote their entire effort to settle it with deliberation. 
2) In the event that such settlement set forth in paragraph (1) above fails, such dispute shall be settled 
through arbitration or alternative settlement or court of justice in accordance with the rules of law. 
3) In the event of dispute in investment sector between Government and any domestic investors, the two 
parties may settle it through arbitration based on agreement between them, and if such settlement 
through arbitration fails, such dispute shall be settled by court of justice. 
4) In the event of dispute in investment sector between Government and any foreign investors, the two 
parties may settle it through international arbitration based on agreement between them. 
Iran Law on Encouragement and Protection 
of Foreign Investment 
2002 UNCTAD No consent  
 
Chapter VI. Settlement of disputes 
Article 19 
If disputes between the government and foreign investors over reciprocal obligations within the 
framework of investments stipulated in this law are not solved through negotiations, they should be 
referred to domestic courts unless under a contract, the government and the respective government of the 
foreign investor have already agreed upon another method for settlement of disputes. 




Disputes arising between parties who are subject to the provisions of this law shall be subject to the Iraqi 
law unless otherwise agreed, contrary to the cases that are subject to the provisions of the Iraqi law 
exclusively or the jurisdiction of Iraqi courts. 
1) Disputes arising from the work contract shall exclusively be subject to the provisions of the Iraqi law 
and the jurisdiction of Iraqi courts. Non-Iraqi laborer shall be exempted if the work contract stipulated 
otherwise. 
2) If parties to a dispute are non-Iraqis and in disputes not arising from a crime, the opponents may agree 
on the law to be applied, the competent court or any other agreement to resolve their dispute. 
3) If a dispute between the partners or between the owner of the project and others in a project subject to 
the provisions of this law resulted in the stoppage of work for a period exceeding three months, the 
Investment Commission may withdraw the license and ask the owners of the project to settle the dispute 
within a period not to exceed three months. If such period elapsed without settling the dispute between 
the partners or between the owner of the project and others, the commission may take legal measures to 
liquidate the project and notify the owner of the project or one of the partners of such action. The 
liquidation money shall be deposited in one of the banks after paying the dues of the State or any other 
dues after final judgment of their entitlement is rendered. 
4) If one of the parties to a dispute is subject to the provisions of this law, they may, at the time of 
signing the agreement, agree on a mechanism to resolve disputes including arbitration pursuant to the 
Iraqi law or any other internationally recognized entity. 
5) Disputes arising between the Commission or any governmental entity and any of those subject to the 
provisions of this law on matters not related to violations of one of the provisions of this law shall be 
subject to Iraqi law and courts on civil matters. As for commercial disputes, parties may resort to 
arbitration provided that such an arrangement is stipulated in the contract organizing the relationship 
between parties. 








Article 33: Investment disputes between an Investor of Foreign Capital and Jordanian governmental 
agencies shall be settled amicably. If no amicable settlement can be reached within a period not 
exceeding six months, either party may resort to litigation or may refer the dispute to ICSID for 
settlement by conciliation or arbitration in accordance with the provision of the Agreement on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between states and Nationals of Other states, which has been signed 
by the Kingdom. 
Kazakhstan Law on Investments 1994-2003 Cases Consent  
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The text of Article 27(3) of Kazakhstan's investment law makes a specific reference to "consent" when it 
states that once an investor chooses ICSID "the consent of the Republic of Kazakhstan 'shall be 
presumed to have been granted.'"  
The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Foreign Investments dated December 27, 1994 (entered into 
force on December 28, 1994) is cited in Rumeli Telekom AS and Telsim Mobil Telekomunikasyon 
Hizmetleri AS v. Republic of Kazakhstan, Award, 29 July 2008. In paras. 332–336, the tribunal 
“considers that it has jurisdiction on the basis of the Foreign Investment Law” (in addition to jurisdiction 
under a BIT).  The case also notes that the relevant law was repealed as of January 8, 2003, and 
replaced.   
The 2003 Law (on record with UNCITRAL does not provide consent. Potestà says that "Article 9 of the 
2003 law merely reminds of the fact of BITs and multilateral treaties that may provide access." 
Article 9. Disputes 
1) Investment disputes can be resolved through negotiations, including with the involvement of experts, 
orin accordance with previously agreed by the parties dispute settlement procedures. 
2) If you can not resolve investment disputes in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this 
article, the resolution of disputes shall be in accordance with international treaties and laws of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan in the courts of the Republic of Kazakhstan, as well as in international 
arbitrations, the parties specified in the agreement. 
3) Disputes not related to investment, are settled in accordance with the laws of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan. 
Kuwait Law Regarding the Promotion of 
Direct Investment 
2013 UNCTAD No consent 
Article 26. Competent courts 
The Kuwaiti courts are the ones solely competent to consider any disputes arising between investment 




Law on Investments 2003 Cases Consent 
The Kyrgyz Republic law has been the basis for several claims, including: Stans Energy Corp and 
Kutisay Mining LLC v Kyrgyz Republic. The award from that arbitration, dated 25 January 2017, is not 
public, but it was summarized in the High Court of Justice case (CL-2017-000115), available here: 
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https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw10537.pdf. High Court (of England and 
Wales) judge noted:   
That Award was rendered in proceedings brought by Stans Energy Corp (“Stans”) and Kutisay Mining 
LLC (“Kutisay”) (together, “the Defendants”) under Article 18(2) of Law No. 66 on investment in the 
Kyrgyz Republic of 27 March 2003 (“the 2003 Investment Law”), in which the Defendants seek 
compensation for the Republic’s alleged violations of Kyrgyz and international law in respect of their 
investments in the Republic’s mining sector. In that Award, the Tribunal dismissed each of the Republic’s 
five objections to jurisdiction that the Tribunal had decided to resolve at that stage.  
• The Kyrgyz Republic applied to the High Court to challenge the substantive jurisdiction of the arbitral 
tribunal. After 47 pages debating if Article 18 (listed below) provides consent, the High Court decision 
finds the Tribunal has jurisdiction.  
Note: in Petrobart Limited v. The Kyrgyz Republic, the investor’s claim was based on an earlier law, but 
the tribunal declined jurisdiction. Award, issued in 2003: 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0627.pdf)  
 Article 18. Settlement of investment disputes  
1) Investment dispute shall be resovled [sic] in accordance with any applicable procedure agreed in 
advance between an investor and authorized state bodies of the Kyrgyz Republic that does not exclude 
the use of other means of legal defense by an investor in accordance with the legislation of the Kyrgyz 
Republic. 
2) If such agreement is not reached the investment dispute between authorized state bodies of the 
Kyrgyz Republic and investor shall be resolved by conducting consultation between parties. If parties 
will not agree in 3 month period from the day of first written address for such consultation, the dispute 
shall be resolved by addressing to a court of the Kyrgyz Republic, unless one of the parties to a dispute 
between the foreign investor and the state body requests to consider the dispute in accordance with one 
of the following procedures: 
a. by applying to the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) pursuant to the 
Convention on settlement of investment disputes between states and citizens of other states or the rules 
regulating the use of additional means for conduct of hearings by the Secretariat of the Center; or  
b. by applying to arbitrage or an international temporary arbitral tribunal (commercial court) formed in 
accordance with the arbitration rules of UN Commission on international trade law.  
3) In the event that an investment dispute is to be resolved through arbitrage as referred to in subpoints 
"a" and "b" of point 2 of this Article, the Kyrgyz Republic shall waive any claim for preliminary 
application of the internal administrative or judicial procedures prior to referral of the dispute to 
international arbitration.  
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4) Any investment dispute between the foreign and domestic investors shall be considered by the 
judicial bodies of the Kyrgyz Republic unless the parties reach an agreement on any other dispute 
settlement procedure, including national and international arbitration.  
5) Disputes between foreign investors and physical and legal entities of the Kyrgyz Republic may be 
resolved under agreement of parties by an arbitral tribunal of the Kyrgyz Republic as well as a foreign 
arbitral tribunal. In case if such agreement is not reached the disputes will be resolved in conformity 
with a procedure provided by the legislation of the Kyrgyz Republic. 
Liberia Investment Act of 2010 2010 UNCTAD Consent  
Note: ICSID (2011-2) lists this as the Investment Act of 2009, but the relevant text is identical. 
Section 12. Dispute settlement Procedures 
1) The courts of Liberia shall have jurisdiction over the resolution of business disputes. Parties to an 
investment dispute may however specify any arbitration or other dispute resolution procedure upon 
which they may agree. 
2) Where a dispute arises between an investor and Government in respect of an enterprise, all efforts 
shall be made through mutual discussion to reach an amicable settlement. 
3) Any dispute between an investor and Government in respect of an enterprise to which this Act applies 
which is not amicably settled through mutual discussions may be submitted at the option of the 
aggrieved party to arbitration as follows: 
a. in accordance with any national or international machinery for the settlement of Investment dispute 
agreed to by the parties. 
b. in the case of a foreign investor: 
(i). in accordance with the rules and procedures for arbitration by the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law; or  
(ii). within the framework of any bilateral or multilateral agreement on investment protection to which 
the Government and the country of which the investor is a national are parties; 
Libya  Law on Investment Promotion 2010 UNCTAD No consent 
Art. 24. Settlement of disputes 
Any dispute that may arise between the foreign investor and the state, which may be attributed to the 
investor or due to procedures taken against him by the state, shall be forwarded to the appropriate courts 
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of the state, unless if there are mutual agreements between the state and the investor’s state or 
multilateral agreements to which the investor’s state is a party thereof, including texts relating to 
reconciliation or arbitration or special agreement between the investor and the state stipulating 
arbitration as a condition. 







Reason behind our coding: Article 6 (2) suggests the parties need to agree on the venue, but Article 6.3 
gives unambiguous access.  “In the case of investment disputes the foreign investor/investors shall have 
the right to apply directly to the ICSID.” 
Article 6. Guarantees of investors’ rights 
1) State and local authorities and officers shall have no right to interfere with the management and use as 
well as disposal of by the investors of the object of investment according to the procedure established by 
law. Damage inflicted upon the investor by unlawful actions of state or local authorities and their 
officers shall be compensated according to the procedure established by the laws of the Republic of 
Lithuania. 
2) Disputes relating to infringement of the rights and lawful interests of the investor/investors shall be 
settled according to the procedure established by the laws of the Republic of Lithuania. Disputes 
between the foreign investor/investors and the Republic of Lithuania relating to infringement of their 
rights and lawful interests (investment disputes) shall be considered, upon agreement between the 
parties, by the courts of the Republic of Lithuania, international arbitration bodies or other institutions. 
3) Investment disputes shall also be settled with due regard being had to the provisions of international 
treaties. In case of investment disputes the foreign investor/investors shall have the right to apply 
directly to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. 
Madagascar Investment Law 2008 UNCTAD Consent 
Note: There is an error in the text, it says "national investor" twice, where we believe it should say 
"foreign investor." While there is some ambiguity, the second half of the article seems likely to be 
interpreted as providing consent.  
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Article 21. Dispute settlement  
Disputes between national investors and the state relating to the interpretation or enforcement of this Act 
are submitted to the competent Malagasy jurisdictions unless the parties have agreed or agree to seek a 
different mean of dispute settlement.  
Disputes between national investors and the state relating to the interpretation or enforcement of this Act 
are regulated in compliance with a legal or arbitration proceeding emerging from:  
• agreements and treaties, relating to the protection of investments, between the Malagasy state and the 
state the concerned investor is a member of; or failing this,  
• the international Convention for dispute settlement, ratified by law N°66-011 dated 5th July 1966, 
relating to investments between States and nationals of other States.  
However, if the foreign investor requests for the proceeding, he is free to choose to submit the dispute 
between him and the State to the Malagasy competent jurisdictions, in place of the arbitration 
proceeding above-mentioned. 
Malawi Investment Promotion Act 1992 UNCTAD No consent 
Access to international arbitration 
The Government acknowledges that investors must have an acceptable forum to resolve disputes that 
cannot be settled amicably. Parties to disputes may agree to pursue arbitration and to choose an 
appropriate forum, including international arbitration. The Government is a member of the International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). 
Mali  Law No. 91-048/AN-RM of 26 
February 1991 Bearing on Investment 
Law 
1991 ICSID  Consent 
Note: Potestà considers this provision to provide unambiguous consent.  
Article 21. The consent [to ICSID arbitration] is made up of this article, as far as the government is 
concerned; it is expressly set out in the application for approval, as far as investors are concerned. 









Note: In the article below, dispute procedure is the choice of the parties (“au choix des parties”), but the 
three options listed as choices are all international arbitration. The US State Department considers this 
Investment Code (Law No 2002-03) to provide consent. Page 6 of this document: 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/227363.pdf  
Article 7.2 "Toutefois toit différend entre une personne physique ou morale étrangère et la République 
Islamique de Mauritanie, relatif à l'applicaion ou 'linterprétation du présent code est réglé conformément 
au choix des parties, conformément à une procédure d'arbitrage et de conciliation découlant: (a) Soit des 
accords et traités relatifs à la protection des investissements conclus entre la République et l'Etat dont la 
personne physique ou morale concernée est ressortissant. (b) Soit d'un arbitrage du CIRDI, crée par la 
Convention, ouverte à la signature à Washington le 18 mars 1965. (c) Soit d'un tribunal arbitral Ad-Hoc 
qui, à…UNCITRAL.”  
There is a later law, in 2012, which is not the same, but also likely to be interpreted as providing 
consent.  
Article 30. Différends relatifs à l'interprétation ou l'application du Code des Investissements 
Tous les différends résultant de l'interprétation ou de l'application du présent Code sont réglés par 
conciliation ou dans l'impossibilité d'entente entre les parties concernées, par voie d'arbitrage, ou selon 
l'option de l'investisseur, par les juridictions mauritaniennes compétentes conformément aux lois et 
règlements de la République Islamique de Mauritanie. 
Les différends entre investisseurs étrangers ou entreprises sous contrôle étranger établies en République 
Islamique de Mauritanie et les autorités publiques de la République islamique de Mauritanie et relatifs 
au présent Code pourront en outre être résolus par conciliation ou arbitrage en vertu: soit d'un commun 
accord entre les deux parties; soit d'accords et traités relatifs à la protection des investissements conclus 
entre la République Islamique de Mauritanie et l'Etat dont l'investisseur est originaire; soit d'un arbitrage 
de la Chambre Internationale de Médiations et d'Arbitrage de Mauritanie (CIMAM) ou du Centre 
International pour le Règlements des Différends relatifs aux Investissements (CIRDI), créé par la « 
Convention pour le Règlement des Différends relatifs aux Investissements » entre Etats et ressortissants 
d'autres Etats du 18 Mars 1965, ratifiée par la Mauritanie. 
Moldova Law on Investments in Entrepreneurial 
Activity 
2004 UNCTAD No consent 
Note: There is an earlier law (1998) that does not mention or consent to international arbitration.  
Article 14. Resolution of investments disputes 
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1) Investment disputes shall be resolved by mutual agreement. 
2) In the event of failure to resolve the dispute by mutual agreement the latter shall be subject to 
resolution by a competent court instance of the Republic of Moldova or, upon mutual consent, by the ad 
hoc or permanent arbitration. 
3) If the parties agreed to resolve the dispute at the arbitration, they shall expressly confirm this fact, 
specifying, if necessary, rules of practice, selected in compliance with legislation of the Republic of 
Moldova on arbitration. 
4) If the parties agreed to resolve the dispute at ad hoc arbitration, the following rules of practice shall be 
taken into account: 
a. Arbitration Rules of United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL Rules); 
b. Arbitration Rules International Chamber of Commerce of Paris, approved on January 1, 1988 (ICC 
Rules); 
c. other principles, norms, rules, established by the parties. 
5) If the parties agreed to resolve the dispute at the permanent arbitration, there shall be taken into 
account international agreements, to which the Republic of Moldova makes part, including: 
a. The 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of International Arbitration 
Awards; 
b. European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of 1961 Done at Geneva; 
c. The 1962 Paris Agreement Relating to Application of the European Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration. 
6) Labor disputes between management of enterprise with foreign investments and its employees shall 
be adjudicated in compliance with legislation of the Republic of Moldova, if otherwise not envisaged for 
foreign employees in individual labor contracts. 
Mongolia Law on Investment 2013 UNCTAD Consent 
Article 7 (9) Unless it is provided by law or in the international treaties, to which Mongolia is a party, an 
investor is entitled to select an international or domestic arbitration to settle any dispute which may arise 
regarding the contract concluded with the state authority of Mongolia. 




Any dispute arising from foreign investment shall be resolved by the competent court in Montenegro, 
unless the decision on establishment i.e. the agreement on investment stipulates that such disputes are 
settled before domestic or foreign arbitration, in compliance with international conventions. 
If a contracting party is the Government, then until the Convention of the International Center for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention) is signed, the disputes arising from foreign 
investments shall be resolved before domestic or foreign arbitration in accordance with the additional 
rules of the ICSID Convention for countries that are not signatories to the ICSID Convention. 
If the contracting parties are domestic or foreign legal entities and natural persons, then disputes arising 
from foreign investments shall be resolved before domestic or international arbitration in accordance 
with the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Rules. 
Mozambique Law on Investment 1993 UNCTAD No consent 
Note: as far as we know, this law has not been interpreted by a tribunal. The language in 25 (2) is 
ambiguous, but the phrase [be entitled to submission] ‘upon express agreement of both parties’ leads us 
to believe a tribunal would likely not find this provision provides consent. 
Article 25. Resolution of disputes 
1) Any disputes arising from the interpretation and application of this Law and its Regulations, which 
cannot be resolved on a friendly basis or by means of negotiation, may be submitted to the competent 
judicial authorities, in accordance with Mozambican legislation, for their resolution. 
2) Disputes between the Government of Mozambique and foreign investors concerning authorised and 
realised investments in the country, which cannot be resolved on the basis provided for in paragraph 1 of 
this Article, shall, unless otherwise agreed, be entitled to submission for resolution through arbitration, 
with possible recourse, upon express agreement of both parties, to: 
a. the rules of the International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States 
and Nationals of other States (ICSID) adopted in Washington on 15th March 1965, or through the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other 
States; 
b. rules set out in the ICSID Additional Facility adopted on the 27th September 1978 by the 
Administrative Council of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes between States 
and Nationals of other States, whenever the foreign investor does not meet the requirements provided for 
in Article 25 of the ICSID Convention; 
c. rules of arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce based in Paris. 
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Namibia Foreign Investment Act 1990 ICSID No consent 
Foreign Investment Act, dated December 19, 1990, as amended by Act No 24 of 1993.  
Article 13. The initial certificate will likely provide for the settlement of disputes by international 
arbitration. Without the certificate providing for international arbitration, then the investor has access to 
local courts, or may agree to international arbitration with the government. 
Nepal Foreign Investment and Technology 
Transfer Act 1992 
1992 UNCTAD Consent  
Section 7. Settlement of Disputes 
1) If any dispute arises between a foreign investor, national investor or the concerned industry, the 
concerned parties shall be required to settle the dispute by mutual consultations in the presence of the 
Department. 
2) If the dispute could not be settled in the manner as referred to in sub-section (1) above, it shall be 
settled by arbitration in accordance with the prevailing arbitration rules of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). 
3) The arbitration shall be held in Katmandu, The laws of Nepal shall be application in the arbitration. 
4) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsections (1), (2) and (3)above , disputes arising in regard to 
foreign investment made in the industries with investment as prescribed may be settled as mentioned in 
the foreign investment agreement. 
Nicaragua Ley de Promocion de Inversiones 
Extranjeras, Ley No. 344, 2000 
2000 ICSID (2002-1) Unclear, 





This provision does not mention specific arbitration centers, but says that any disputes may be submitted 
to international arbitration in accordance with what is established by regulation (“podrá someterse a 
Arbitraje Internacional de acuerdo con lo que se disponga reglamentariamente”).  
Article 8. Toda diferencia, controversia o reclamo que surja o se relacione con las inversiones 
extranjeras reguladas por la presente Ley, podrá someterse a Arbitraje Internacional de acuerdo con lo 
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que se disponga reglamentariamente, sin perjuicio de la aplicación de las normas legales nacionales 
vigentes y los convenios de los que la República de Nicaragua sea parte. 
Niger Code des investissements en 
Republique du Niger 
1989 ICSID Consent   
 
This Investment Code (Ordinance No 89-19 dated December 8, 1989) is then amended in 1997, 1999, 
2001. 
Article 6. The settlement of disputes related to the validity, interpretation or the application of the deed 
of agreement and the possible determination of compensation due to the ignorance or violation of the 
commitments will be subject to one of the arbitration procedures hereinafter to be determined in the 
deed of agreement: (1) constitution of an arbitration board (specifies directions for this) (2) The 
possibility for the non national to remedy to ICSID created by the convention dated march 18th 1965 of 
the IBRD. 
Nigeria Nigerian Investment Promotion 
Commission Act 
1995 UNCTAD Consent 
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Note: We initially coded this law as not providing consent. Then the tribunal in Interocean Oil 
Development Company and Interocean Oil Exploration Company v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/13/20) found that this law provided them with jurisdiction. The ‘Decision on Preliminary 
Objections’ is here: https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw6336.pdf  As far as 
we know, the Interocean tribunal is the only one to have interpreted this clause, so we follow their 
decision.  
Section 27. Dispute settlement 
1) Where a dispute arises between an investor and any Government of the Federation in respect of an 
enterprise all efforts shall be made Procedure through mutual discussion to reach an amicable settlement. 
2) Any dispute between an Investor and any Government of the Federation in respect of an enterprise to 
which this Act applies which is not amicably settled through mutual discussions may be submitted at the 
option of the aggrieved party to arbitration as follows: 
a. in respect of a Nigerian investor, in accordance with the rules of procedure for arbitration as specified 
in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1988; or 
b. In the case of a foreign investor, within the framework of any bilateral or multilateral agreement on 
investment protection to which the Federal Government and the country of which the investor is a 
national disputes agreed on by the parties; 
c. in accordance with any other national or international machinery for the settlement of investment 
disputes agreed on by the parties. 
3) Where in respect of any dispute, there is disagreement between the investor and the Federal 
Government as to the method of dispute settlement to be adopted; the International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes Rules shall apply. 
Oman Foreign Capital Investment Law 1994 UNCTAD No consent 
Article 14 
It may be agreed to refer any dispute between the foreign investment projects and third parties to a local 
or international arbitration tribunal. 
Papua New 
Guinea 
Investment Promotion Act 1992 1992 Case No consent 
This provision was the basis for the claim in PNG Sustainable Development Program Ltd v Papua New 
Guinea (ICSID Case No ARB/13/33). The tribunal found the law does not contain consent to arbitration. 
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Article 39. "The Investment Disputes Convention Act (Chapter 346) implementing the ICSID 
Convention; applies, according to its terms, to disputes arising out of foreign investment."  
The Investment Disputes Convention Act, Article 2 states: “A dispute shall not be referred to the Centre 
[the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)] unless the dispute is 
fundamental to the investment itself”  
Paraguay Ley de Inversiones 1992 UNCTAD No consent 
Artículo 9 
Los inversionistas nacionales y extranjeros, así como las entidades del Estado, incluyendo los entes 
autárquicos y las demás entidades de derecho público que contrataren con el inversor extranjero, podrán 
acordar someter sus diferencias a tribunales arbitrales nacionales o internacionales, de conformidad con 
las normas legales nacionales e internacionales pertinentes. 
Qatar Law on Organization of Foreign 
Capital in the Economic Activity 
2000 UNCTAD No consent 
Article 11 
It may be agreed to solve any dispute arising between the investor and any other party through Local or 
international arbitration commission. 
Russian 
Federation 
Law on Foreign Investments 1999 UNCTAD Unclear, 




Note: as far as we know, no tribunal has interpreted this provision yet.  
In 2014, Anton Asoskov provided an expert opinion for three PCA arbitrations (Hulley Enterprises 
Limited v. The Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 226; Veteran Petroleum Limited v. The Russian 
Federation, PCA No AA 228; Yukos Universal Limited v. The Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 
227). Jurisdiction was based on the Energy Charter Treaty, but his expert opinion also addresses the 
1999 law (pages 23-30) available here (https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw4153.pdf). Asoskov finds the law does not provide consent to arbitration.   
A tribunal may well come to different conclusion than the Russian Supreme Court, but the Supreme 
Court touched on Article 10 in a case on forum selection (Pages 33-34 here: 
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http://vsrf.ru/Show_pdf.php?Id=11489). The Court was deciding if a Russian court or foreign court had 
jurisdiction to recover a loan; it referred to Article 10 and implied that forum selection comes in a 
separate instrument.  
Article 10. The guarantee of proper resolution of a dispute arising from performance of foreign 
investment and entrepreneurial activities by a foreign investor in the territory of the Russian Federation. 
A foreign investor's dispute arising in connection with the implementation of investment and 
entrepreneurial activities in the territory of the Russian Federation shall be resolved in compliance with 
international treaties of the Russian Federation and federal laws in the court or arbitration court or in an 
international arbitration court. 
Rwanda Law Relating to Investment Promotion 
And Facilitation 
2015 UNCTAD No consent 
Article 9. Dispute settlement 
Any dispute arising between a foreign investor and one or more public organs in connection with a 
registered investment enterprise shall be amicably settled. 
When an amicable settlement cannot be reached, parties shall refer the dispute to an arbitration agency 
as agreed upon in a written agreement between both parties. 
Where no arbitration procedure is provided under a written agreement, both parties shall refer the matter 
to the competent court. 
Sierra Leone The Investment Promotion Act, 2004 2004 UNCTAD Consent 
Section 16 
1) Where a dispute arises between an investor and the Government in respect of an investment in a 
business enterprise or in respect of an investment obstructed or delayed by Government, the parties will 
use their best efforts to settle such dispute amicably. 
2) Where any dispute between an investor and the Government in respect of a business enterprise is not 
settled amicably, it may be submitted at the option of the aggrieved party to arbitration as follows– 
a. in accordance with the rules of procedure for arbitration of the United National Commission on 
International Trade Laws (UNCITRAL).  
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b. in the case of a foreign investor within the framework of any bilateral or multilateral agreement on 
investment protection to which the Government and the country of which the investor is a national are 
parties; or  
c. in accordance with any other national or international machinery for the settlement of investment 
disputes as the parties may agree.  
3) Where any dispute between an investor and a nongovernmental body in respect of an enterprise is not 
settled amicably, and where no recourse is available through arbitration or previously established 
contracts or other legal instruments, then the matter shall be referred to the relevant legal authority 
within Sierra Leone for settlement, in accordance with the law binding such transaction. 
Solomon 
Islands 
Foreign Investment Act 2005 2005 UNCTAD No consent 
Section 28. Disputes 
1) The law of Solomon Islands applies to disputes involving foreign investors who conduct investment 
activities. 
2) A dispute involving a foreign investor who conducts an investment activity shall be dealt with under 
the law of Solomon Islands as if it were a dispute involving a citizen of Solomon Islands. 
3) To the extent that the Convention of Settlement of Investment Disputes (which was signed by 
Solomon Islands in Washington on 12 November 1979 and acceded to by Solomon Islands on 8 October 
1981) is not inconsistent with the law of Solomon Islands, it applies to, and shall be complied with by, 
foreign investors who conduct investment activities as a law of Solomon Islands. 
Somalia The Foreign Investment Law 1987 UNCTAD Consent 
Article 19. Settlement of disputes 
1) Disputes in respect of the implementation of this law shall be settled: 
a. In a manner to be agreed upon with the investor, or in the absence of such agreement; 
b. Within the framework of the agreements in force between the Somali Democratic Republic and the 
investor's home country, or, in the absence of (a) and (b); 
c. Within the framework of the Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between the State 
and the Nationals of Other Countries, to which Somalia has adhered by virtue of Law No. 11 of 1967, 
when such convention applies. 
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2) In the absence of agreements or convention as per paragraph 1 of this Article, disputes shall be settled 
through arbitration. An arbitration board shall be established, comprising one member on behalf of each 
disputing party and a third member acting as a chairman, to be jointly named by the said two members. 
In the case that the disputing parties fail to agree on the nomination of the chair-man within 30 days of 
the date of the nomination of the second member, the chairman shall be appointed by the President of 
the Supreme Court of Somalia. The Arbitration Board shall lay down its rules of procedure unrestricted 
by the rules contained in the civil and commercial code of procedures, save for the rules which relate to 
the basic guarantees and principles of litigation. The Board shall see to it that the disputes be expediently 
resolved. Awards shall be rendered by majority vote, and shall be final and binding on both parties and 
enforceable as any other final judgment. The Arbitration Board shall decide who shall bear the 
arbitration costs. 
South Sudan The Investment Promotion Act, 2009 2009 UNCTAD Consent  
Article 39. Dispute Resolutions 
1) The courts of Southern Sudan shall have jurisdiction over the resolution of business disputes. 
2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (1) above, parties to an investment dispute may specify 
any arbitration or other dispute resolution mechanisms upon which they may agree, within or outside the 
courts. 
3) Where a dispute rises between an investor and the Government in respect of an enterprise, all efforts 
shall be made to reach an amicable settlement. 
4) Any dispute between an investor and the Government in respect of an enterprise to which this Act 
applies but not amicably settled may be submitted at the option of the aggrieved party to arbitration as 
follows — 
a. in accordance with the rules and procedures for arbitration by the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes; or 
b. in case of a foreign investor, within the frame work of any bilateral or multilateral agreement on 
investment protection to which the Government and the country of which the investors is a national, are 
parties; or 
c. in accordance with any other national or international machinery for the settlement of investment 
disputes, agreed to by the parties. 
5) Any arbitral award made in respect of arbitration proceeding conducted in terms of this section shall 
be final and bindings on the parties, without such a ward having to be made an order of the court and the 
parties shall give effect to such award forthwith. 
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6) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (5) above, a party in whose favour an award has been 
made shall be entitled to apply to the High Court for an order to compel the other party to comply with 
that award, and the High Court shall have the jurisdiction to grant such as order. 
Sudan National Investment Encouragement 
Act 2013 
2013 UNCTAD No consent 
Article 39. Resolving of investment disputes 
1) With exceptions to the disputes governed by the terms of the agreements stipulated for in item (2), if 
any legal dispute ensues in respect of the investment, shall be initially presented to the competent court 
unless the parties agree to refer it to arbitration or reconciliation. 
2) The terms of the Unified Agreement for the Investment of Arabic Capital in Arab States 1980, 
Agreement for Settlements of Investment Disputes among Arab States 1974, Agreement for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes Among States and Nationals of other Countries 1965, General Agreement for 
Economical , Technical and Commercial Co-operation among Members Sates of Islamic Conference 
1977 or any other agreement in this respect where Sudan is a party thereof, shall be applicable on any 
legal dispute arises directly from any of the said agreements. 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
Investment Promotion Law 2007 UNCTAD Ambiguous, 






Note: as far as we know, no tribunal has interpreted this provision yet. 
Article 7 
a) Investment-related disputes between an investor and Syrian public bodies and institutions shall be 
settled amicably. If the disputing parties could not reach a solution amicably in three months from the 
date of making a written notification for an amicable settlement by one of the disputing parties, each of 
them shall have the right to take the case to one of the following: 
1. Arbitration. 
2. Competent Syrian Courts. 
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3. Arab Investment Court created pursuant to the Unified Agreement for the Investment of Arab Capitals in 
the Arab states in 1980. 
4. Investment Insurance and Protection Agreement signed by Syria and the investor’s country, or any Arab 
or international organization. 
b) All investment-related disputes shall be considered by the competent court as summary proceedings. 
Earlier Law: Law No 10 of 1991 (and Law No 7 of May 7, 2000 amending Investment Law No 10 or 
1991). No consent.  
No mention of international arbitration. Then, possible resort to Arab Investment Court is mentioned in 
2000 amendments. 
Tajikistan The Law of the Republic of Tajikistan 
on Investments 
2007 UNCTAD No consent 
Article 22. Settlement of investment disputes 
1) Investment disputes between participants of investment activity are solved according to the conditions 
stipulated by contracts, concluded between the parties. In case of absence of the specified contracts, 
investment disputes between participants of investment activity are settled as far as possible, by 
consultation of the parties. 
2) In case of impossibility of the settling of investment disputes according to the concluded contracts, 
disputes will be settled in the courts of the Republic of Tajikistan, and also in the international 
arbitration court, the arbitration court determined under the consent of the parties, according to acts of 
the Republic of Tajikistan and is international-legal acts. 
Earlier version: Law on Foreign Investments in the Republic of Tajikistan (2000). Same dispute 
settlement provision included in 1994 ICSID.) No consent.  
Article 36. Local courts unless provided for otherwise by treaty.  
Tanzania Tanzania Investment Act 1997 UNCTAD No consent  
Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, 24 
July 2008 (finding that Section 23.2 of the Tanzania Investment Act which provided that “A dispute 
between a foreign investor and the [Tanzania Investment] Centre may be submitted to arbitration in 
accordance with any of the following methods as may be mutually agreed by the parties, that is to say – 
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(b) in accordance with the rules of procedure for arbitration of the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes” did not constitute a standing unilateral offer to arbitrate.)  
Tribunal in Biwater Gauff Ltd v United Republic of Tanzania found the provision did not embody a 
standing unilateral offer to arbitrate by Tanzania; the tribunal emphasized the language "as may be 
mutually agreed by the parties" was an insurmountable obstacle. (noted by Potestà too) 
Section 23. Settlement of disputes 
1) Where a dispute arises between a foreign investor and the Centre or the Government in respect of a 
business enterprise, all efforts shall be made to settle the dispute through negotiations for an amicable 
settlement. 
2) A dispute between a foreign investor and the Centre or the Government in respect of a business 
enterprise which is not settled through negotiations may be submitted to arbitration in accordance with 
any of the following methods as may be mutually agreed by the parties, that is to say- 
a. in accordance with arbitration laws of Tanzania for investors; 
b. in accordance with the rules of procedure for arbitration of the International Centre for the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes; 
c. within the framework of any bilateral or multilateral agreement on investment protection agreed to by 
the Government of the United Republic and the Government of the Country the Investor originates. 
Timor-Leste Private Investment Law 2005 ICSID Consent 
Article 23 (2) Os diferendos entre o Estado e os investidores externos de nacionalidade estrangeira, que 
não possam ser solucionados nos termos previstos no número anterior, salvo acordo em contrário, são 
resolvidos por via da arbitragem em conformidade com as regras da Convenção Internacional de 
Resolução de (CIRDI).  
Togo Code Des Investissements 1989 ICSID Consent 
Potestà considers this article as unambiguous consent. 
Le consentement des parties à la compétence du CIRDI requis par les instruments le régissant, est 
constitué en ce qui concerne la République togolaise par le présent article et, en ce qui concerne la 
personne intéressée, est exprimé dans la demande d’agrément. 
Tonga Foreign Investment Act 2002 2002 UNCTAD No consent 
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Article 16. Investment guarantees 
1) The provisions of the Arbitration Act 1996 (UK) shall apply to any arbitration under this Act. 
2) Subject to this Act and any other laws, the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes shall 
have the force of law in Tonga. 
Turkey Foreign Direct Investment Law 2003 UNCTAD No consent 
Article 3 
a) Freedom to Invest and National Treatment 
Unless stipulated by international agreements and other special laws: 
1. Foreign investors are free to make foreign direct investments in Turkey, 
2. Foreign investors shall be subject to equal treatment with domestic investors. 
b) Expropriation and Nationalisation  
Foreign direct investments shall not be expropriated or nationalised, except for public interest and upon 
compensation in accordance with due process of law. 
c) Transfers 
Foreign investors can freely transfer abroad: net profits, dividends, proceeds from the sale or liquidation 
of all or any part of an investment, compensation payments, amounts arising from license, management 
and similar agreements, and reimbursements and interest payments arising from foreign loans through 
banks or special financial institutions. 
d) Access to Real Estate 
[Annuled] 
e) Dispute Settlement 
For the settlement of disputes arising from investment agreements subject to private law and investment 
disputes arising from public service concessions contracts and conditions which are concluded with 
foreign investors, foreign investors can apply either to the authorised local courts, or to national or 
international arbitration or other means of dispute settlement, provided that the conditions in the related 
regulations are fulfilled and the parties agree thereon.  
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Uganda Investment Code Act 1991 UNCTAD No consent 
Section 28. Settlement of disputes 
1) Where a dispute arises between a foreign investor and the authority or the Government in respect of a 
licensed business enterprise, all efforts shall be made to settle the dispute through negotiations for an 
amicable settlement. 
2) A dispute between a foreign investor and the authority or the Government in respect of a licensed 
business enterprise which is not settled through negotiations may be submitted to arbitration in 
accordance with the following methods as may be mutually agreed by the parties: 
a. in accordance with the rules of procedure for arbitration of the International Centre for the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes; 
b. within the framework of any bilateral or multilateral agreement on investment protection to which the 
Government and the country of which the investor is a national are parties; or 
c. in accordance with any other international machinery for the settlement of investment disputes. 
3) The licence in respect of an enterprise may specify the particular mode of arbitration to be resorted to 
in the case of a dispute relating to that enterprise, and that specification shall constitute the consent of 
the Government, the authority or their respective agents and the investor to submit to that mode and 
forum of arbitration. 
4) Where the parties to a dispute do not agree on the mode or forum for arbitration, the party aggrieved 
by compulsory acquisition or possession or the amount of compensation payable, or in respect of any 
other matter relating to the business enterprise may apply to the High Court for the determination of any 
of the following: 
a. his or her interest or right; 
b. the legality of the taking of the possession or acquisition of the property, interest or right; 
c. the amount of compensation to whi8ch he or she is entitled and the prompt payment of that 
compensation; 
d. any other matter in dispute relating to the business enterprise. 
Uzbekistan Law on Guarantees and Measures of 
Protection of Foreign Investors' Rights 
1998 UNCTAD No consent 
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The tribunal in Metal-Tech Ltd. v. The Republic of Uzbekistan (ICSID ARB/10/3) examined this law 
and concluded ‘that Article 10 of the Law of Guarantees does not provide the basis of consent to ICSID 
jurisdiction.’ (at 388, available here: http://cisarbitration.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/METAL-
TECH-LTD.-v.-THE-REPUBLIC-OF-UZBEKISTAN.pdf )  
This law was also the basis for the claim made in Newmont USA Limited and Newmont (Uzbekistan) 
Limited v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/20. This claim settled, with Uzbekistan 
paying $80 million, and Newmont transferring its stake to Uzbekistan. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-newmont-uzbekistan/gold-miner-newmont-resolves-dispute-with-
uzbekistan-idUSN2336630420070723  
The Metal-Tech tribunal further noted (at 383): “To the Tribunal, Article 10 does not embody 
Uzbekistan's consent to submit disputes to ICSID arbitration independently of the BIT. Paragraph (1) of 
Article 10 merely states that a dispute which the Parties are unable to resolve amicably may be resolved 
by the Economic Court of Uzbekistan or through arbitration. It contains no expression of consent to a 
particular arbitral mechanism. More specifically, it embodies no offer by the State to submit to dispute 
settlement in the ICSID framework; ICSID is not even mentioned. The Tribunal notes that statutory 
provisions more specific than Article 10 – even provisions expressly naming ICSID – have been held 
not to contain state consent to ICSID arbitration.”  
Article 10. Settlement of disputes 
Dispute associated with foreign investments (investment dispute) directly or indirectly, can be settled on 
agreement of the parties by consultation between them. If the parties will not be able to achieve agreed 
settlement, than such dispute should be settled either by an economic court of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan or by arbitration in accordance with the rules and procedures of international agreements 
(conventions) on settlement of investment disputes, to which the Republic of Uzbekistan has been 
joined. 
The parties involved in investment dispute can, on mutual agreement, determine the authority settling 
such dispute, as well as a county which can execute arbitration legal procedure of investment dispute. 
Foreign investors' disputes, not associated with their investment activity on the territory of the Republic 
of Uzbekistan, shall be settled in accordance with the legislation of the Republic of Uzbekistan except 
for cases when other procedure for dispute settlement is provided by an agreement in keeping with the 
rules of international law. 
 
Venezeula Ley de Promoción y Protección de 
Inversiones 
1999 Cases No consent 
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Venezuela’s domestic law has been the basis for multiple claims, but to our knowledge, tribunals have 
declined jurisdiction. Cases include: Brandes Investment Partners, LP v. Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela ICSID Case ARB/08/3; Cemex Caracas II Investments B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/15; and Mobil v Venezuela.  
The Mobil v. Venezuela tribunal decided that Article 22 of the Venezuelan law did not provide consent 
to arbitration. They quoted Article 22 of the Venezuelan law:  
“Disputes arising between an international investor whose country of origin has in effect with Venezuela 
a treaty or agreement on the promotion and protection of investments, or disputes to which are 
applicable the provision of the Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(OMGI—MIGA) or the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States (ICSID), shall be submitted to international arbitration according to the terms 
of the respective treaty or agreement, if it so provides, without prejudice to the possibility of making use, 
when appropriate, of the dispute resolution means provided for under the Venezuelan legislation in 
effect.”  
Yemen Investment Law 2010 UNCTAD Consent 
Article 26 
a) Yemeni commercial courts shall be the competent authority to resolve investment disputes in 
accordance with the provisions of this law. 
b) Without prejudice to the provisions of the previous paragraph, the parties to an investment dispute 
may agree to settle their dispute amicably or through arbitration. 
c) In the event any dispute arises between the investor and the government with respect to the project, 
the dispute may be settled amicably. Should an amicable settlement not be reached, the dispute shall be 
referred to arbitration in accordance with the following: 
1. The arbitration rules and procedures of any national or regional recognized arbitration center. 
2. The applicable arbitration rules and procedures of the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL). 
Zambia Zambia Development Agency Act  2006 UNCTAD No consent 
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Article 21. Settlement of disputes 
Any dispute arising as a consequence of an investment under this Act shall be settled in accordance with 
the Arbitration Act. 
The Arbitration Act of 2000 does not itself provide consent to investor-state arbitration; an arbitration 








Appendix B. Descriptive statistics  
Table B1. Summary statistics, models 4-6, Table 2 
Statistic N Mean SD Min P25 P75 Max 
FIAS, last 3 yrs. 4546 0.046 0.209 0 0 0 1 
FIAS, last 5 yrs. 4546 0.064 0.244 0 0 0 1 
Rigorous and imp. adm. 3866 0.585 1.548 -3.631 -0.657 1.768 4.623 
Accountability 3866 0.654 0.960 -1.693 -0.119 1.503 2.191 
GDP(log) 4429 23.789 2.541 17.276 21.933 25.814 30.440 
GDP per capita(log) 4429 8.431 1.538 4.749 7.135 9.672 11.886 
Time since indep.(log) 4539 3.991 1.265 0 3.258 4.787 7.609 
Regime durability(log) 3804 2.637 1.304 0 1.792 3.584 5.333 
ISDS claims, cum. 4546 0.798 3.618 0 0 0 59 
IIAs signed, cum. 4546 22.824 23.404 0 4 35 109 





Table B2 - Summary statistics, models 4-6, Table 2 
Statistic N Mean SD Min P25 P75 Max 
FIAS, last 3 yrs. 4942 0.050 0.219 0 0 0 1 
FIAS, last 5 yrs. 4942 0.073 0.260 0 0 0 1 
Rigorous and imp. adm. 4249 0.514 1.509 -3.631 -0.655 1.647 4.623 
Accountability 4249 0.625 0.945 -1.693 -0.134 1.431 2.191 
GDP(log) 4825 23.816 2.510 17.276 22.036 25.770 30.440 
GDP per capita(log) 4825 8.375 1.532 4.749 7.103 9.567 11.886 
Time since indep.(log) 4935 3.996 1.242 0 3.258 4.787 7.609 
Regime durability(log) 4187 2.615 1.297 0 1.792 3.584 5.333 
ISDS claims, cum. 4942 0.852 3.607 0 0 0 59 
IIAs signed, cum. 4942 22.881 23.341 0 5 34 109 





Table B3 - Bivariate correlations between independent variables from regression models in Table 
2 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) Rigorous and imp. adm. 1.00         
(2) Accountability 0.75 1.00        
(3) GDP (log) 0.49 0.48 1.00       
(4) GDP per capita (log) 0.71 0.57 0.71 1.00      
(5) Time since indep. (log) 0.39 0.38 0.49 0.37 1.00     
(6) Regime durability (log) 0.47 0.27 0.43 0.53 0.35 1.00    
(7) Arbitration claims, cum. 0.05 0.13 0.21 0.11 0.07 0.10 1.00   
(8) IIAs signed, cum. 0.29 0.25 0.40 0.35 0.22 0.25 0.22 1.00  





Appendix C. Robustness checks 
We conduct a range of additional checks to verify our findings. As a standard rule, we use 
models 2 and 5, and sometimes also models 3 and 6 from Table 2 in our robustness checks.  
We first run two sets of placebo tests to further assess the strength of the claim to causal 
inference we make in our main analysis. The first set of tests assess how our findings are 
influenced by manipulating the year of our event of interest – i.e. mention or consent to 
arbitration in domestic investment laws. Figures C1 to C4 depict how the regression coefficient 
and corresponding significance levels for our two FIAS variables change when we move the date 
of consent or mention of arbitration in domestic investment laws five years backward and five 
years forward.51 The markers depict regression coefficients and the whiskers represent 99.5% 
confidence intervals. Each plot exhibits the same tendency. While the relationship between 
completed FIAS projects on domestic legal reform and adoption of arbitration clauses in 
domestic investment laws is statistically significant in the years immediately before and after the 
actual date of mention or consent (which is not surprising, given the slow nature of domestic 
legal reform processes), both the magnitude and statistical significance of this relationship 
declines as we move away from the actual year in which the law was passed. Around plus/minus 
two years after the actual date of mention or consent, the statistical relationship is no longer 
significant. 
The second set of placebo tests assess whether there is a statistical relationship between 
FIAS advisory projects and variations in another class of domestic laws: environmental 
legislation. For data on environmental legislation, we rely on ECOLEX, an information service 
 
51 In Figure C3, we had to drop the tests where the year of consent was moved three, four and five years 
forward. The coefficient in these models was so small that the whisker plot became unreadable. 
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on environmental law operated by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO), the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP).52 We use two dependent variables; one that counts all 
environmental acts at the country-level between 1986 and 2015, and one that counts only 
legislative acts in this same period. We follow Berge and Berger (2019) in logging each count 
variable, as a small change in regulatory activity from one year to the next should be of less 
importance if the total load of environmental legislative acts in a country is already very high 
than if the baseline level of legislative activity is low. We also rely on Berge and Berger (2019) 
for correct model specification and confounding covariates. We use pooled cross-section 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with country fixed effects, year fixed effects and a 
lagged dependent variable in all models.53 The results from the second set of placebo tests is 
reported in Table C1. The results are unequivocal: there is no relationship between finalized 
FIAS advisory projects on domestic legal reform and variations in domestic environmental 
regulatory or legislative activity, regardless of how environmental legislation is measured, or 
which version of the FIAS variable is applied.  
Next, we run two sets of tests assessing whether the relationship between FIAS technical 
assistance and arbitration clauses in domestic investment laws is part of a wider development 
trend driven by the broader advisory complex and donor community; or whether it is riven by 
more investment-specific economic factors and the country-level.  
 
52 ECOLEX is the most comprehensive global source of information on environmental law, and it has a 
repository of all available domestic environmental legislation and regulations enacted around the 
world. See: https://www.ecolex.org/. 
53 See in-depth reasoning behind each covariate in Berge and Berger (2019). We use a skimmed down 
version of their covariate set. 
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To control for the broader advisory complex, we introduce two new covariates. To assess 
whether arbitration clauses is FIAS’ brainchild, or whether other IOs also push for this same type 
of reform, we include a variable that captures whether a country has received an investment 
policy review (IPR) from UNCTAD in the last three years.54 To measure the overall donor 
activity in countries, we control for the log of the net inflows of official development assistance 
(ODA).55 Tables C2 and C3 reports the findings from Cox regression models including these two 
variables, the former using time-to-mention as dependent variable and the latter using time-to-
consent.  
A couple of things are worth noting when examining the results in Table C3 and C4. 
First, the effect of FIAS advisory projects on the domestic law adoption rate is not influenced in 
any significant way by controlling for the broader advisory or donor complex (compare the 
baseline models – 15 and 19 – with the other models in the Tables C3 and C4 respectively). 
Second, receiving an investment policy review from UNCTAD does not seem to independently 
influence the rate of adoption of domestic investment laws with arbitration clauses. Third, 
increases in the total inflow of ODA does have an independent effect on the rate of law adoption, 
with more ODA leading to an increase in the rate of adoption of domestic investment laws with 
mention or consent to arbitration. As such, there does seem to be some other, donor-driven 
 
54 UNCTAD is a key actor in the international advisory complex on investment policy and law. In 
addition to hosting forums for deliberation between government officials such as the bi-annual World 
Investment Forum, and providing extensive data services on international investment agreements and 
investor-state dispute settlement cases (see: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/), they have since 
1999 conducted extensive country-level investment policy reviews (IPRs) that often include very 
specific reform suggestions. These reviews take into account the entirety of the regulative framework 
for foreign direct investment, thereunder any domestic investment law or code in force. See: 
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-policy-review.  
55 Data taken from the World Development Indicators, see: 
https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-development-indicators. As the ODA variable can 
take on negative values, we use an alternative log-transformation: 𝑦 = ln⁡(𝑥 + √𝑥2 + 1)⁡(Busse and 
Hefeker 2007: 404–405). 
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factors that influence countries propensity to adopt domestic investment laws with arbitration 
clauses, but these do not in any way confound the influence of FIAS. It is more likely that they 
work in tandem with FIAS advice. 
To control for more investment-specific factors at the country-level, we introduce four 
additional control variables: the log of total inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI);56 trade as 
percentage of GDP; annual use of International Monetary Fund (IMF) credits; and, annual GDP 
growth.57 Tables C4 and C5 reports the findings from Cox regression models including these 
additional control variables, the former using time-to-mention as dependent variable and the 
latter using time-to-consent. While some of the controls reduce the size of the FIAS-effect on the 
rate of adoption of investment laws somewhat, the high levels of significance are retained 
throughout. The totality of the models in Table C4 and C5 indicate that our findings are robust to 
more investment-specific economic control variables. 
Next, we assess whether our findings are robust to the use of other estimation methods. 
We first run parametric survival models, assuming an exponential survival distribution. Table C6 
report results from four models using both time-to-mention and time-to-consent as dependent 
variables. All four models reproduce the effect of FIAS assistance on the rate of adoption of 
domestic investment laws with arbitration clauses. We then use mention of/consent to arbitration 
in domestic laws as binary outcome variables, and run logit models with year fixed effects, and 
rare-event logit models.58 Tables C7 and C8 report the results from these regressions, and all 
 
56 FDI data was taken from UNCTAD, see: https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-
Statistics.aspx.  
57 Data on trade, IMF credits and GDP growth were taken from the World Development Indicators, see: 
https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-development-indicators. 
58 Logit models are known to suffer from small-sample bias (Firth 1993; King and Zeng 2001). In our 
data, the events in question become very rare when using mention of or consent to arbitration as binary 
outcome variables with a panel data set-up (72 of 4546 observations when using the mention-version 
of our dependent variable, and 36 of 4546 observations when using consent). We use the firthlogit 
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eight models reproduce a strong, significant relationship between FIAS and mention of/consent 
to arbitration in domestic investment laws. Our findings do not seem to be driven by our choice 
of estimator. 
Finally, we run two sets of sensitivity tests. In the first set we remove our control 
variables one-by-one, and see how that influences the FIAS regression coefficient. Figures C5 
and C6 represent 10 replications of each of models 2 and 5 in Table 2, each removing one of the 
ten control variables. Neither set of replications indicate that the relationship between FIAS and 
domestic investment law adoption rates is driven by our choice of control variables. In the 
second set of sensitivity tests, we use a jackknife procedure to remove each observed country 
spell from the sample one-by-one. Figures C7 and C8 plot the density of the coefficients from 
156 replications of each of models 2 and 5 in Table 2. The density of each set of coefficients is 
very high, and the maximum fluctuation of the regression coefficients in each set is only about 
plus/minus 0.1. Our results are remarkably robust to the influence of individual country spells. 
All in all, our robustness checks lend strong support to the conclusions we reach in our 
article. In particular, the two sets of placebo tests, and the tests controlling for the broader 
advisory complex significantly strengthens our belief that the relationship between FIAS 
technical assistance and adoption of domestic investment laws with arbitration clauses is indeed 
of a causal nature. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure C1. Placebo tests manipulating the year of mention five years backward and five years 
forward. Replications based on model 2 in Table 2. Markers represent regression coefficients for 






Figure C2. Placebo tests manipulating the year of mention five years backward and two years 
forward. Replications based on model 3 in Table 2. Markers represent regression coefficients for 






Figure C3. Placebo tests manipulating the year of consent five years backward and three years 
forward. Replications based on model 5 in Table 2. Markers represent regression coefficients for 






Figure C4. Placebo tests manipulating the year of consent five years backward and five years 
forward. Replications based on model 6 in Table 2. Markers represent regression coefficients for 





Table C1. Pooled cross section OLS regression. Placebo tests assessing the relationship between 
FIAS technical assistance and domestic environmental legislation 
 DV: All env. acts DV: Env legislative acts 
  Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
FIAS, previous 3 yrs. -0.042  -0.013  
 (0.043)  (0.053)  
FIAS, previous 5 yrs.  -0.044  -0.010 
  (0.036)  (0.043) 
Rigorous and imp. adm.(t-1) 0.092*** 0.093*** 0.058* 0.058* 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.035) 
Polyarchy(t-1) -0.079 -0.078 0.081 0.082 
 (0.171) (0.171) (0.165) (0.165) 
GDP per capita (log)(t-1) 0.009 0.007 -0.046 -0.046 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.059) (0.060) 
Population (log)(t-1) 0.039 0.040 0.024 0.024 
 (0.131) (0.131) (0.131) (0.131) 
IIAs signed, cum. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
MEA membership 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Env. acts(t-1) 0.544*** 0.543***   
 (0.024) (0.024)   
Env. legislation(t-1)   0.297*** 0.297*** 
   (0.025) (0.024) 
Constant -0.191 -0.179 0.380 0.379 
 (2.302) (2.305) (2.168) (2.166) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4416 4416 4416 4416 
R2 0.491 0.491 0.192 0.192 
Note: All models are estimated using pooled cross section OLS regression. The dependent variable in models 7 and 
8 is the natural logarithm of the sum of all environmental acts listed in ECOLEX in any given year for any given 
country. The dependent variable in models 9 and 10 is the natural logarithm of the sum of all environmental 





Table C2. Cox regression models: FIAS and mention of arbitration in domestic investment laws, 
controlling for the broader advisory and donor complex 
 DV: Time-to-mention 
  Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
FIAS, previous 3 yrs. 7.549*** 7.545*** 6.110*** 6.122*** 
 [4.267,13.355] [4.256,13.377] [3.254,11.470] [3.250,11.530] 
UNCTAD IPR, previous 3 yrs.  1.085  0.887 
  [0.217,5.423]  [0.187,4.208] 
Net ODA (log)   1.487** 1.488** 
   [1.069,2.068] [1.071,2.068] 
Rigorous and imp. adm. 0.875 0.874 0.938 0.939 
 [0.660,1.159] [0.658,1.161] [0.687,1.281] [0.685,1.288] 
Accountability 1.061 1.061 1.063 1.063 
 [0.688,1.637] [0.689,1.635] [0.679,1.666] [0.678,1.667] 
GDP (log) 1.097 1.096 0.964 0.965 
 [0.922,1.305] [0.919,1.306] [0.729,1.273] [0.730,1.275] 
GDP per capita (log) 0.688* 0.689* 0.875 0.875 
 [0.473,1.001] [0.472,1.004] [0.566,1.355] [0.565,1.354] 
Time since indep. (log) 0.778* 0.778* 0.740* 0.740* 
 [0.583,1.037] [0.584,1.037] [0.526,1.042] [0.525,1.043] 
Regime durability (log) 1.039 1.039 1.048 1.048 
 [0.839,1.285] [0.839,1.286] [0.829,1.323] [0.830,1.323] 
Arbitration claims, cum. 0.864 0.864 0.905 0.904 
 [0.703,1.061] [0.700,1.067] [0.747,1.095] [0.745,1.098] 
IIAs signed, cum. 0.989 0.989 0.990 0.990 
 [0.975,1.004] [0.975,1.004] [0.974,1.005] [0.974,1.005] 
IBRD loans (log) 1.007 1.007 0.983 0.983 
 [0.968,1.048] [0.968,1.048] [0.949,1.019] [0.949,1.019] 
Spells (# countries) 156 156 124 124 
Events (# mentions) 70 70 64 64 
Observations 3475 3475 2273 2273 
AIC 582.661 584.650 508.181 510.156 
Note: Cox proportional hazard models, estimates in hazard ratios. 95 per cent confidence intervals in brackets. * p < 




Table C3. Cox regression models: FIAS and consent to arbitration in domestic investment laws, 
controlling for the broader advisory and donor complex 
 DV: Time-to-consent 
  Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 
FIAS, previous 3 yrs. 7.549*** 7.991*** 6.151*** 6.188*** 
 [4.267,13.355] [3.786,16.868] [2.715,13.935] [2.687,14.248] 
UNCTAD IPR, previous 3 yrs.  0.868  0.767 
  [0.098,7.681]  [0.096,6.159] 
Net ODA (log)   1.669* 1.671* 
   [0.951,2.930] [0.957,2.919] 
Rigorous and imp. adm. 0.875 0.921 0.881 0.887 
 [0.660,1.159] [0.601,1.413] [0.567,1.370] [0.566,1.391] 
Accountability 1.061 1.196 0.988 0.988 
 [0.688,1.637] [0.655,2.183] [0.535,1.824] [0.537,1.818] 
GDP (log) 1.097 0.930 0.727 0.730 
 [0.922,1.305] [0.737,1.173] [0.457,1.155] [0.456,1.170] 
GDP per capita (log) 0.688* 0.580** 0.916 0.911 
 [0.473,1.001] [0.355,0.948] [0.490,1.711] [0.483,1.716] 
Time since indep. (log) 0.778* 0.947 0.934 0.933 
 [0.583,1.037] [0.679,1.322] [0.650,1.341] [0.649,1.341] 
Regime durability (log) 1.039 1.166 1.158 1.160 
 [0.839,1.285] [0.860,1.580] [0.828,1.620] [0.831,1.619] 
Arbitration claims, cum. 0.864 1.037 1.060 1.059 
 [0.703,1.061] [0.971,1.108] [0.985,1.140] [0.984,1.140] 
IIAs signed, cum. 0.989 0.974* 0.971* 0.971* 
 [0.975,1.004] [0.947,1.002] [0.942,1.001] [0.942,1.001] 
IBRD loans (log) 1.007 1.007 1.006 1.006 
 [0.968,1.048] [0.948,1.069] [0.955,1.059] [0.956,1.059] 
Spells (# countries) 156 156 124 124 
Events (# consents) 35 35 33 33 
Observations 3475 3989 2727 2727 
AIC 582.661 300.575 275.886 277.822 
Note: Cox proportional hazard models, estimates in hazard ratios. 95 per cent confidence intervals in brackets. * p < 




Table C4. Cox regression models: FIAS and mention of arbitration in domestic investment laws, 
controlling for investment-specific, country-level economic factors 
  Model 23 Model 24 Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 
FIAS, previous 3 yrs. 7.549*** 7.202*** 6.384*** 7.288*** 7.518*** 5.791*** 
 [4.267,13.355] [3.948,13.139] [3.523,11.569] [4.120,12.895] [4.244,13.316] [3.108,10.789] 
FDI inflows (log)  1.121    1.147* 
  [0.977,1.287]    [0.976,1.348] 
Trade (% of GDP)   1.000   0.997 
   [0.996,1.005]   [0.991,1.002] 
IMF Credits (log)    1.042  1.041 
    [0.985,1.101]  [0.973,1.114] 
GDP growth     1.013** 1.016 
     [1.002,1.024] [0.995,1.038] 
Rigorous and imp. adm. 0.875 0.868 0.914 0.866 0.870 0.895 
 [0.660,1.159] [0.641,1.174] [0.688,1.215] [0.649,1.156] [0.658,1.150] [0.663,1.209] 
Accountability 1.061 1.007 0.964 1.062 1.080 0.928 
 [0.688,1.637] [0.645,1.570] [0.611,1.521] [0.694,1.623] [0.700,1.667] [0.587,1.465] 
GDP (log) 1.097 0.985 1.068 1.069 1.096 0.887 
 [0.922,1.305] [0.795,1.220] [0.875,1.304] [0.893,1.279] [0.921,1.305] [0.679,1.159] 
GDP per capita (log) 0.688* 0.725 0.644** 0.725 0.691* 0.759 
 [0.473,1.001] [0.480,1.095] [0.431,0.962] [0.494,1.065] [0.475,1.005] [0.483,1.193] 
Time since indep. (log) 0.778* 0.768* 0.801 0.790 0.776* 0.765 
 [0.583,1.037] [0.568,1.037] [0.571,1.123] [0.587,1.064] [0.581,1.035] [0.526,1.113] 
Regime durability (log) 1.039 1.052 1.015 1.054 1.029 1.046 
 [0.839,1.285] [0.834,1.327] [0.808,1.275] [0.844,1.316] [0.831,1.276] [0.813,1.344] 
Arbitration claims, cum. 0.864 0.855 0.851 0.859 0.861 0.844 
 [0.703,1.061] [0.689,1.063] [0.667,1.086] [0.698,1.057] [0.699,1.061] [0.654,1.089] 
IIAs signed, cum. 0.989 0.986* 0.989 0.990 0.989 0.987 
 [0.975,1.004] [0.972,1.002] [0.974,1.004] [0.975,1.005] [0.975,1.004] [0.971,1.004] 
IBRD loans (log) 1.007 1.014 1.004 0.979 1.008 0.983 
 [0.968,1.048] [0.966,1.064] [0.965,1.045] [0.928,1.032] [0.969,1.050] [0.919,1.050] 
Spells (# countries) 156 154 155 156 156 153 
Events (# mentions) 70 66 66 70 70 62 
Observations 3475 3389 3159 3475 3473 3094 
AIC 582.661 546.129 541.355 582.452 583.522 506.546 
Note: Cox proportional hazard models, estimates in hazard ratios. 95 per cent confidence intervals in brackets. * p < 




Table C5. Cox regression models: FIAS and consent to arbitration in domestic investment laws, 
controlling for investment-specific, country-level economic factors 
 DV: Time-to-consent 
  Model 29 Model 30 Model 31 Model 32 Model 33 Model 34 
FIAS, previous 3 yrs. 7.971*** 8.184*** 6.542*** 7.807*** 7.823*** 6.528*** 
 [3.828,16.594] [3.747,17.873] [3.009,14.223] [3.743,16.283] [3.727,16.423] [2.781,15.324] 
FDI inflows (log)  1.025    1.022 
  [0.861,1.220]    [0.834,1.252] 
Trade (% of GDP)   1.001   1.001 
   [0.995,1.007]   [0.994,1.009] 
IMF Credits (log)    1.037  1.046 
    [0.941,1.143]  [0.907,1.208] 
GDP growth     1.010 0.998 
     [0.983,1.038] [0.927,1.074] 
Rigorous and imp. adm. 0.918 0.984 0.925 0.919 0.914 0.997 
 [0.604,1.396] [0.649,1.492] [0.595,1.438] [0.602,1.400] [0.603,1.386] [0.651,1.527] 
Accountability 1.196 1.029 1.066 1.186 1.210 0.908 
 [0.654,2.186] [0.568,1.866] [0.561,2.023] [0.662,2.125] [0.659,2.222] [0.481,1.712] 
GDP (log) 0.928 0.874 0.917 0.906 0.925 0.835 
 [0.741,1.160] [0.659,1.158] [0.717,1.174] [0.712,1.154] [0.737,1.161] [0.585,1.190] 
GDP per capita (log) 0.582** 0.645 0.548** 0.612* 0.582** 0.660 
 [0.359,0.945] [0.376,1.105] [0.326,0.922] [0.365,1.026] [0.358,0.944] [0.372,1.169] 
Time since indep. (log) 0.947 0.904 1.017 0.956 0.950 0.943 
 [0.679,1.322] [0.629,1.297] [0.676,1.529] [0.678,1.349] [0.680,1.329] [0.603,1.474] 
Regime durability (log) 1.165 1.226 1.119 1.176 1.161 1.192 
 [0.858,1.582] [0.861,1.745] [0.798,1.570] [0.865,1.599] [0.851,1.583] [0.798,1.779] 
Arbitration claims, cum. 1.038 1.034 1.046 1.044 1.038 1.052 
 [0.972,1.107] [0.969,1.105] [0.981,1.116] [0.970,1.124] [0.973,1.108] [0.971,1.139] 
IIAs signed, cum. 0.974* 0.977* 0.970* 0.975* 0.974* 0.973 
 [0.947,1.002] [0.950,1.004] [0.939,1.001] [0.947,1.003] [0.947,1.002] [0.941,1.007] 
IBRD loans (log) 1.007 1.024 1.021 0.982 1.007 1.017 
 [0.948,1.069] [0.949,1.104] [0.952,1.095] [0.903,1.067] [0.948,1.070] [0.886,1.167] 
Spells (# countries) 156 155 155 156 156 154 
Events (# consents) 35 32 33 35 35 30 
Observations 3989 3902 3640 3989 3987 3574 
AIC 298.594 274.954 277.774 299.812 300.316 257.810 
Note: Cox proportional hazard models, estimates in hazard ratios. 95 per cent confidence intervals in brackets. * p < 





Table C6. Exponential parametric survival models: FIAS and mention of or consent to arbitration 
in domestic investment laws 
 DV: Time-to-mention DV: Time-to-consent 
  Model 35 Model 36 Model 37 Model 38 
FIAS, previous 3 yrs. 8.231***  8.070***  
 [4.866,13.923]  [3.906,16.670]  
FIAS, previous 5 yrs.  6.859***  6.344*** 
  [4.018,11.710]  [2.985,13.484] 
Rigorous and imp. adm. 0.869 0.871 0.923 0.929 
 [0.657,1.150] [0.660,1.150] [0.627,1.359] [0.630,1.370] 
Accountability 1.119 1.115 1.194 1.174 
 [0.724,1.730] [0.716,1.738] [0.671,2.123] [0.658,2.092] 
GDP (log) 1.076 1.082 0.924 0.925 
 [0.916,1.263] [0.916,1.278] [0.739,1.156] [0.733,1.166] 
GDP per capita (log) 0.689* 0.681* 0.555** 0.546** 
 [0.472,1.007] [0.460,1.007] [0.318,0.968] [0.304,0.979] 
Time since indep. (log) 0.824* 0.811* 0.936 0.927 
 [0.656,1.035] [0.640,1.028] [0.666,1.314] [0.648,1.325] 
Regime durability (log) 1.069 1.077 1.222 1.235 
 [0.864,1.323] [0.866,1.339] [0.901,1.657] [0.904,1.686] 
Arbitration claims, cum. 0.915 0.910 1.026 1.027 
 [0.794,1.055] [0.781,1.061] [0.950,1.109] [0.947,1.114] 
IIAs signed, cum. 0.988 0.988 0.973* 0.973* 
 [0.974,1.002] [0.974,1.003] [0.945,1.002] [0.944,1.002] 
IBRD loans (log) 1.008 1.007 0.999 0.995 
 [0.968,1.051] [0.964,1.051] [0.930,1.072] [0.922,1.075] 
Constant 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.010* 0.012* 
  [0.000,0.005] [0.000,0.006] [0.000,1.124] [0.000,1.691] 
Spells (# countries) 156 156 156 156 
Events (# mentions/consents) 70 70 35 35 
Observations 3475 3475 3989 3989 
AIC 265.682 270.454 185.493 189.782 
Note: Exponential parametric survival models. Estimates in hazard ratios. 95 per cent confidence intervals in 




Table C7. Logit and rare-event logit models, mention of arbitration in domestic investment laws 
 DV: Time-to-mention 
 Logit Rare event logit 
  Model 39 Model 40 Model 41 Model 42 
FIAS, last 3 yrs. 2.234***  2.171***  
 (0.302)  (0.276)  
FIAS, last 5 yrs.  2.039***  1.969*** 
  (0.298)  (0.268) 
Rigorous and imp. adm. -0.115 -0.105 -0.138 -0.132 
 (0.155) (0.153) (0.150) (0.148) 
Accountability 0.004 -0.003 0.090 0.082 
 (0.239) (0.242) (0.222) (0.221) 
GDP (log) 0.091 0.095 0.065 0.071 
 (0.092) (0.095) (0.085) (0.085) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.369* -0.388** -0.361** -0.377** 
 (0.193) (0.198) (0.172) (0.173) 
Time since indep. (log) -0.233* -0.233* -0.194 -0.205* 
 (0.129) (0.132) (0.124) (0.125) 
Regime durability (log) 0.043 0.048 0.058 0.063 
 (0.114) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) 
Arbitration claims, cum. -0.199* -0.199 0.004 0.003 
 (0.114) (0.122) (0.068) (0.072) 
IIAs signed, cum. -0.010 -0.010 -0.012 -0.012 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
IBRD loans (log) 0.017 0.014 0.007 0.005 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
Constant -2.298 -2.174 -2.138 -2.123 
  (1.972) (2.003) (1.649) (1.663) 
Year FE Yes Yes   
Observations 2963 2963 3475 3475 
Pseudo R2 0.174 0.168     
Note: Logit and rare-event logit models. Robust standard errors clustered on countries in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 




Table C8. Logit and rare-event logit models, consent to arbitration in domestic investment laws 
 DV: Time-to-consent 
 Logit Rare event logit 
  Model 43 Model 44 Model 45 
Model 46 
FIAS, previous 3 yrs. 2.362***  2.093***  
 (0.374)  (0.364)  
FIAS, previous 5 yrs.  2.058***  
1.844*** 
  (0.380)  
(0.360) 
Rigorous and imp. adm. -0.033 -0.030 -0.061 
-0.053 
 (0.217) (0.215) (0.202) 
(0.199) 
Accountability 0.057 0.038 0.132 
0.116 
 (0.310) (0.307) (0.312) 
(0.309) 
GDP (log) -0.091 -0.090 -0.076 
-0.075 
 (0.121) (0.124) (0.125) 
(0.125) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.501* -0.527* -0.578** 
-0.598** 
 (0.262) (0.278) (0.248) 
(0.250) 
Time since indep. (log) -0.086 -0.071 -0.060 
-0.067 
 (0.171) (0.177) (0.187) 
(0.190) 
Regime durability (log) 0.128 0.144 0.184 
0.194 
 (0.159) (0.160) (0.167) 
(0.167) 
Arbitration claims, cum. 0.012 0.019 0.069* 
0.071** 
 (0.048) (0.047) (0.035) 
(0.035) 
IIAs signed, cum. -0.026* -0.026* -0.025* 
-0.025* 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
(0.015) 
IBRD loans (log) 0.019 0.013 -0.006 
-0.010 
 (0.032) (0.034) (0.030) 
(0.030) 
Constant 2.365 2.416 1.395 
1.578 
  (2.410) (2.519) (2.467) 
(2.487) 
Year FE Yes Yes   
Observations 2611 2611 3989 
3989 
Pseudo R2 0.198 0.186   
  
Note: Logit and rare-event logit models. Robust standard errors clustered on countries in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 





Figure C5. Sensitivity test, removing control variables one-by-one. Based on model 2 in table 2, 
with time-to-mention as dependent variable. Markers represent regression coefficients for FIAS 






Figure C6. Sensitivity test, removing control variables one-by-one. Based on model 4 in table 2, 
with time-to-consent as dependent variable. Markers represent regression coefficients for FIAS 






Figure C7. Sensitivity test, jackknife procedure, removing country spells one-by-one. The plot 
illustrates the density of the regression coefficient for 156 replications of model 2 in table 2. 








Figure C8. Sensitivity test, jackknife procedure, removing country spells one-by-one. The plot 
illustrates the density of the regression coefficient for 156 replications of model 2 in table 2. 
Time-to-consent as dependent variable. 
 
 
